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Abstract
The 2016 election sparked fundamental changes in American politics. From the
rise of Donald Trump’s popularity to the growth of progressive protests in response to his
election and subsequent policies, this paper explores how fundamental changes stemming
from the 2016 election directly impacted American Jewish interest groups and political
stances, particularly on the issue of Israel. Prior to the 2016 election, the American
Jewish community was growing increasingly divided on Israel primarily due to the
disparate experiences between young Jews and that of older generations, as well as
increasingly right-wing Israeli politics. However, the election of Trump—and his
alignment with pro-Israel policies—furthered the already existing divides across
American Jewish politics. The result has been increased polarization between American
Jewish groups and the mobilization of progressive groups to counteract pro-Israel
organizations and Trump’s illiberal policies. This paper aims to illustrate how these
changes within American Jewish politics are connected to the 2016 election through three
case studies of Jewish Israel-related organizations from across the political spectrum.
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1
Introduction
About
The election of President Donald Trump was a tumultuous time in America. The
months leading up to November 2016, and the months following, elucidated and further
intensified political polarization across the United States—divisions that often pervaded
previously united communities. American Jews are just one example of an identity group
that experienced significant changes following the 2016 election. American Jewish life
has always had some religious political and cultural divides. However, over the last four
years, American Jewish interest groups’ mobilization and actions have changed;
significant growth within and acceptance of particular American Jewish interest groups
indicates either changes to Americans Jews’ political stances or, at the very least, a
newfound willingness to mobilize around their beliefs. One example is the liberal propeace and pro-Israel organization J Street has increased its traction in the American
Jewish community. Moreover, as organizations outside of established American Jewish
organizations grow in popularity this signifies a shift in the broader representation of
different viewpoints across organizational life.
These changes generate a research question: How have fundamental changes in
America’s political culture shaped American Jews’ political stances and affected the
representation of viewpoints within American Jewish interest groups? I explore this
research question through three case studies; the American Israel Public Affairs
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Committee, IfNotNow, and J Street. In these case studies, I analyze the recent internal
changes within American Jewish organizations related to Israel and/or the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict. I argue that the recent changes within these organizations elucidates
how the election of Donald Trump has catalyzed changes to American Jewish life.
This chapter provides an introduction to my research question. I chose to explore
changes within American Jewish life through changes within organizations, rather than
overall through polling data. Although the most recent and reliable polling and survey
data can illustrate the broader religious, political, and cultural trends of American Jews,
this data alone cannot adequately answer my research question. Instead, an exploration of
three very different American Jewish Israel-related organizations—each of which have
experienced significant and important internal changes since 2016—provides a clearer
picture of how Jewish life has changed. This chapter concludes with a discussion of my
methodological approach to exploring these three Jewish organizations and a roadmap
that describes how each chapter contributes to larger arguments in response to my
research question.

Polling Data
In order to understand the changes underlying Jewish political social life, I
analyze how polling data has approached this question. The lack of recent, unbiased, and
accurate polling data reveals the need to look deeper at organizational history and
changes—which is the goal of this thesis. Although the existing sociological research and
polling depict the broad spectrum of cultural, religious, and political beliefs and practices
of American Jews, this data falls short of depicting the changes to American Jewish life
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since the 2016 election. American Jews hold a vast spectrum of viewpoints on all
issues—religious, political, cultural, and social. For example, while some do agree with
the actions and beliefs espoused by President Donald Trump, many disagree with the
current President’s policies. The vast changes in American politics since 2016 have likely
impacted American Jewish political life. Nonetheless, there is a lack of recent,
comprehensive, and unbiased polling of American Jews and reports since 2016, meaning
that other methodological strategies must be pursued in order to better understand and
document these changes. Without accurate and recent polling data it is also difficult to
discern the extent to which apparent changes in American Jewish politics were the result
of internal factors or have been driven by external American politics.
The most recent and extensive survey of American Jewish politics, “A Portrait of
Jewish Americans,” was conducted by Pew Research Center in 2013, several years before
the more recent changes that I am examining began taking place. This data is still
important as it depicts the previously existing divides and trends, and can be compared
across time to the 2000 National Jewish Population Survey.1 However, the lack of more
recent survey data means that these findings are no longer accurate today, and that it is
difficult to document how the changes in American politics resulting from the 2016
election might have spurred changes. Throughout my thesis, I compare the 2013 Pew
Research Center report to the minimal recent and reliable survey data that I have found.

1

These results are based on two surveys with two different populations. Although they
provide some structure to compare across time, the surveys’ different methodologies may
limit the accuracy of comparison. Pew Research Center describes how these differences
include, “different questions to identify Jews, different questions to examine attitudes and
demographics, such as intermarriage and child rearing, different approaches in and in
statistically weighting the data” (Pew Research Center 2013).
6

The survey data I have examined depicts the already existing divides within
American Jewish life. American Jews are not one unified group with similar beliefs and
practices; rather, they are a fragmented population with many disagreements over the
issues, values, and practices that define their ideas of Judaism. To start, American Jews
are incredibly religiously diverse as illustrated by the vast number of denominations. The
2013 Survey documented this denominational diversity identifying 35% Reform, 18%
Conservative, 10% Orthodox (including ultra-Orthodox and Modern Orthodox, 6% other
(including Reconstructionist and Jewish Renewal movements), and 30% nondenominational (Pew Research Center 2013, 10). The 2013 survey also denoted a trend of
decreasing denominational attachment across generations. Compared with the older
generations, younger Jews were “more likely to have no denominational attachment”
(Pew Research Center 2013, 49).
Although there is political diversity, in 2013 American Jews supported the
Democratic Party over the Republican Party by “more than three-to-one: 70% say they
are Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 22% are Republicans or lean
Republican” (Pew Research Center 2013, 16). This was largely consistent with surveys
from the decade prior where roughly two-thirds of Jews identified as Democrats or
Democratic-leaners (Pew Research Center 2013, 96). The voting patterns of American
Jews in the 2016 presidential election also aligns with the 2013 data, since 71% voted for
Hilary Clinton, and 23% voted for Donald Trump (CNN 2016). Meanwhile, in the 2018
midterm elections “roughly eight-in-ten Jewish voters (79%) cast their ballots for
Democrats (Sciupac and Smith 2018).
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There is also some alignment between denominational and political affiliation.
Whereas 77% of Reform Jews and 77% of non-denominational Jews are Democrat or
lean Democrat, Orthodox Jews do not fit the democratic Jewish paradigm: “roughly
half…describe themselves as political conservatives, and 57% identify with or lean
toward the Republican Party” (Pew Research Center 2013, 95).
The spectrum of beliefs within Jewish America also extends to different notions
of what practices are essential to Judaism. Today, one of the most polarizing and
important issues of disagreement is whether attachment to and support for Israel is an
essential practice. This issue has likely gained traction since the very existence of a
modern state, and many older Jews’ personal memory of living in a time without a Jewish
state, pushes the majority of Jews to grapple with what the state does or ought to mean to
them. For one population of American Jews today—or 4-in-10—an emotional
attachment to the modern Jewish state is central to their practice of Judaism. Polling data
from 2000 and 2013 depicts that the relative number of American Jews who are “very or
somewhat attached to Israel” has remained relatively stagnant (Cohen, Mott, Blass,
Schwartz, Ament, Klaff, Kotler-Berkowitz 2001).
Although many factors might be correlated with emotional attachment to Israel,
the 2013 profile indicates a correlation between attachment to Israel and particular
denominational and political affiliations, as well as age. Orthodox and Conservative Jews
were more likely to see Israel as an essential part of being Jewish (at 55% and 58%
respectively) as opposed to Reform and non-denominational Jews who are much less
likely see Israel as an essential part of being Jewish (at 42% and 31% respectively) (Pew
Research Center 2013, 54). American Jewish Republicans are much more likely to see
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caring about Israel as an essential part of being Jewish than Democrats (Pew Research
Center 2013, 57). Moreover, the older generation of American Jews is also more likely to
be attached to Israel; whereas 35% of American Jews over 50 were very attached to
Israel, this was true of only 25% of American Jews under the age of 25 (Pew Research
Center 2013, 54).
Although for some American Jews Israel is central to their Judaism, many others
define their identity through other practices and values. According to the Pew Research
Center 2013 profile, many more of the surveyed American Jews valued four other
practices higher than Israel. These other values are remembering the Holocaust, leading
an ethical/moral life, working for justice and equality, and being intellectually curious
(Pew Research Center 2013, 57). The results of a more recent Jewish Electoral Institute
poll published in May 2019 similarly illustrated how Jewish Americans today prioritize a
broad diversity of political issues more than supporting Israel. This JEI survey had Jewish
voters rank their political priorities and found that “Israel ranked 16th out of 16 issues”
that mattered when deciding upon which candidate to support; instead they prioritized
other issues like protecting Medicare and Social Security (Quoted in Rubin 2019).
Another area of vast disagreement is approval of President Donald Trump and his
administration’s policies. Approval of President Trump has been complicated by the
number of actions Trump has taken to appeal to the pro-Israel camp of Jewish
Americans. To start, Trump moved the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. Second, in May of 2018, President Trump withdrew from the much-debated
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the “Iran Deal” which was signed during
President Barack Obama’s term in 2015. Next, the Trump Administration, in a highly
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controversial move, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Even more,
President Trump has not pressured the Israeli government to halt the continuous
expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In November 2019, the Trump
administration declared that they do not see Israeli settlements as a violation of
international law (Lederman and Williams 2019). The combination of these pro-Israel
policies has contributed to many pro-Israel Jews’ support for Trump.
Since American Jews are in no way a homogenous group, other American Jews
have expressed extensive disapproval of President Trump; they disagree for a diversity of
reasons, making overarching assumptions implausible. For American Jews who identify
with the Democratic party and are pro-Israel, the election of Trump placed many in an
uncomfortable position: they had to decide whether they would praise and thank Trump
for delivering several monumental pro-Israel policies, despite their disagreement with his
other policies. At an American Jewish event, President Trump appeared to “blur the lines
between the American Jews in the audience and Israelis,” referring to Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel at one point as “your prime minister” (Cochrane 2019).
This has led some American Jews who are more critical of Israel to push back on the
assumption that loyalty to Israel can buy American Jewish votes. A 2019 Pew Research
Center poll shows that 4-in-10 American Jews believes that Trump is favoring the Israelis
too much, especially in ways his policies affect the Israel-Palestinian peace process
(Smith 2019).
For American Jews who disapprove of President Trump, their beliefs have also
been largely shaped by Trump’s policies to undermine the rights of other minorities,
including Muslims, Latinx, and LGTBQ people, among others. Many have mobilized
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within Jewish and non-Jewish groups to organize against President Trump, particularly
against those policies that have negatively impacted and undermined minority groups as a
result of his policies.
Jewish Americans today are also concerned with how President Trump’s actions
have affected the physical safety and emotional well-being of American Jews. The 2019
JEI poll illustrates how many Jewish Americans disapprove of President Trump’s actions
and policies, as it relates to the security of Jews in America:
nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of Jewish voters believe Jewish Americans are
less secure than they were two years ago, 71 percent disapprove of the way
President Trump has handled anti-Semitism, and nearly 60 percent believe that he
bears at least some responsibility for the shootings at synagogues in Pittsburgh
and Poway. (Rubin 2019)
Some American Jews point to Trump’s endorsement by white supremacist groups and
how the rise of Trump has invigorated the efforts of these groups. For example, they see
the violent Charlottesville protest in 2017 as a pivotal example of how Trump’s policies,
such as his immigration policies and the Muslim Ban, have given rise to, and legitimated,
the intolerance views of extremist hate groups. Even more, the four violent incidents on
American Jewish communities since October 2018 have invoked fear. Most notable was
the 2018 Pittsburg shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue which was the largest attack
on Jewish lives in American history, killing eleven and injuring six (Margollin, Torres,
Barr 2020).
Overall, polling data can, in broad brush strokes, indicate that larger changes have
and are taking place within American Jewish life. The 2013 Pew Poll, for example, does
provide a clear picture of the previously existing schisms among American Jews before
the Trump era. However, without unbiased and recent survey data, it is not clear how the
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2016 election results have interacted with and continue to affect the multitude of
American Jewish opinions on divisive issues, particularly Israel. The impact of other
recent and resulting changes in American politics since 2016, like increasing political
polarization between Republicans and Democrats or the growth of progressive politics
within the Democratic party on American Jewish political opinions and mobilization,
requires further examination. This lack of recent, widespread, and unbiased polling data
has motivated me to look for evidence of how fundamental changes resulting from the
2016 election directly impacted American Jews’ political mobilization and public
opinions. Therefore, I instead examine three Israel-related interest groups from a across
the political spectrum. Examining how particular groups of American Jews with different
sets of beliefs have changed since 2016 can provide insights to my research question of
how fundamental changes in American Politics have impacted American Jewish political
life.

Interest Groups
My thesis examines three Israel-related organizations—each with their own
distinctive values, issues, and strategies—to better illuminate shifts in American Jewish
life among different segments of the population. The first organization I explore is the
American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) which is an important member of
the American Jewish establishment. As a bipartisan pro-Israel lobby group, AIPAC’s
mission is to “to strengthen, protect and promote the U.S.-Israel relationship in ways that
enhance the security of the United States and Israel” (AIPAC 2020). Although it is not
explicitly Jewish, it is the most powerful pro-Israel organization that attracts American
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Jews and is a member of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations (Cop). As the “vital core” of AIPAC’s membership, American Jews from
across the country support the organization by donating money, lobbying Congressional
Representative, attending events like the annual national Policy Conference event in
Washington, DC, and meeting regionally in local Jewish spaces (Bruck 2014).
AIPAC exists among a much larger and broader network of establishment
organizations. Historically, established American Jewish groups have provided a united
front on Israel, promoting ‘blanket’ support for American pro-Israel and domestic Israeli
policies. Many of these organizations have existed for decades and serve at the heart of
American Jewish cultural and religious life. One way of understanding the boundaries of
the establishment are those organizations who are members of an institution called the
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP). Encompassing
fifty-one prominent organizations, CoP aims to create an apparent consensus on Jewish
issues (CoP 2019). Organizations within CoP are voted in by its member organizations.
While some hold semi-diverse viewpoints, the member organizations have banded
together to work towards the mission of “advance[ing] the interests of the American
Jewish community, sustain[ing] broad-based support for Israel and address[ing] the
critical concerns facing world Jewry” (CoP 2019).
AIPAC (along with most establishment organizations) can be described by the
value of “particularism.” This term describes and defines “how Jews see themselves in
relation to Gentiles, their obligations to those inside and outside the Jewish community,
and their sense of the purpose of the world” (Barnett 2016, 7). Central to particularisms is
a notion of Jewish purpose and place in the world as Am Segulah, or “chosen people.”

13

This value understands the Jewish people as distinctly and uniquely situated in the world
and aligns with how AIPAC understands the Jewish historical experience and advocates
for the Jewish connection to Israel.
Throughout American Jewish history, establishment organizations have long
faced scrutiny and questioning from American Jews who disagree with policies pursued
on issues like Israel. However, the American Jewish establishment today faces
unprecedented challenges that stem from other American Jewish organizations. In
particular, two new organizations—J Street and IfNotNow—have arisen that represent
the different types of challenges faced by the establishment. These organizations question
AIPAC (and others) right to power and their ability to dictate American Jewish policy on
Israel. They also present difficulties to the establishment by drawing otherwise engaged
membership, particularly among younger generations. While the two organizations are
similar in that they both challenge the establishment, they take two very different angles.
My thesis compares how J Street and IfNotNow’s different values, strategies, and
issues differ from one another, and from AIPAC, as well as how recent changes in
American politics have affected each group differently. The growth and creation of both
IfNotNow and J Street are significant for two major reasons. First, they reflect recent
changes in the viewpoints of American Jews over controversial issues like Israel. Second,
the founding of these organizations marks a new period in American Jewish life as they
provide the space for better representation of diverse viewpoints outside the structure of
the American Jewish establishment.
The second case study follows IfNotNow (INN), a Jewish progressive activist
group that was founded during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict by American Jews who were
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“angered by the overwhelmingly hawkish response of American Jewish institutions”
(INN 2019). The organization’s goal to “end American Jewish support for the
occupation,” seeks to ground their movement in the “values of Jewish tradition” (INN
2019). Unlike the Jewish establishment that is defined by the value of particularism, INN
has embraced universalism (Barnett 2016, 7). Universalism encompasses an obligation to
care for all people around the world, whereas particularism prioritizes care for other
Jews.
One way that INN has challenged the American Jewish establishment is through
protests outside AIPAC’s annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC. Comparing the
growth in the number of protestors between 2016 and 2017 provides a clear indication of
the changes and challenges to American Jewish life today. Whereas in 2016, INN’s
protest was comprised of approximately 200 people, by 2017 the number of American
Jews who mobilized outside of AIPAC’s policy conference grew by 500 percent. This
was the largest, mostly Jewish, protest in AIPAC’s organization’s 54-year history with
more than 1000 protestors present (Bellware 2017). Although American Jews have long
protested and questioned the policies of established Jewish organizations, this particular
protest should be regarded as significant both due to its magnitude and implications to the
status quo among American Jewry.
The third organization, J Street, stands somewhere in the middle between INN
and AIPAC in terms of its values, issues, and strategies. Founded in 2007, J Street
embraces Zionism, as it “organizes and mobilizes pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans who
want Israel to be secure, democratic and the national home of the Jewish people” (J Street
2019). However, J Street is distinct from establishment organizations that embrace
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‘blanket’ support for Israel; the organization questions Israeli and American policies that
go against the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and a future two-state solution. By
recognizing Israel as a Jewish national home while also promoting the values of peace,
democracy, and co-existence, J Street straddles the values of universalism and
particularism. In recent years, the organization has attracted Democratic presidential
primary candidates to speak at its annual national conference—many of whom previously
would have likely supported AIPAC instead; this choice might depict an evolving
Democratic party that is now more critical of Israel.
The existing literature on recent changes within American Jewish politics,
especially related to Israel, approaches the subject in three different ways. One approach
understands these changes through the lens of ‘critical engagement:’ critique and
questioning of Israel and related policies are driven out of care for the future of the
Jewish state (Waxman 2017, 181). Another approach views young American Jews’
criticism of Israel and their increasing disinterest in traditional institutions with pro-Israel
policies as indicating a growing culture of indifference (Beinart 2010). Meanwhile, the
third approach interprets these changes as a part of a broader trend towards embracing the
values of social justice and tikkun olam (or repairing the world) over others like
Zionism); these values are what have driven many American Jews to criticize the actions
of the Israeli government, and American Jewish institutions unwavering support for Israel
(Omer 2019) (Barnett 2017). My research explores these three threads, and places them
in conversation with my organizational analysis, to show why, how, and to what extent
changes to American Jewish life are taking place.
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My thesis explores how the rise of President Trump, and the resulting
unprecedented changes in American political culture, has affected American Jewish life.
The lack of recent and comprehensive survey data since the 2016 election means that my
methodology necessarily focuses on understanding interest group representation after
2016. Although both the groups that I explore in opposition to AIPAC and the broader
establishment were founded prior to the election, these groups have mobilized
significantly following the election. The growing array of American Jewish interest
groups, particularly on the left and far-left, and their increasing popularity among
American Jews since 2016 should not be overlooked. My research tries to understand the
extent to which these changes are connected to broader changes in American society,
particularly the massive mobilization of political movements on the left to resist Trump’s
policies, as opposed to the previously existing internal trends within American Jewish
political life. My research question is thus important not only to American Jews but also
has implications for and may relay broader changes within American society.

Methodology
To understand how monumental changes within American politics have affected
American Jewish life, I compare the values, strategies, and issues of AIPAC, INN, J
Street. I chose to study these three organizations as opposed to others for three reasons.
First, they are all engaging on similar topics: the American Jewish relationship to Israel.
Second, existing literature depicts to some extent the changes within these three
organizations; for AIPAC this has meant challenge and for the others, this has meant
growth in membership and popularity. Third, each organization’s mission and actions
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provide a clear depiction of the different categories of American Jewish organization
values and issues.
After describing the values, strategies, and issues of each organization, I explore
how fundamental changes in American politics since the 2016 election have impacted
each organization. I rely upon existing literature in order to find evidence for, interpret,
and understand the recent internal changes within each of the three American Jewish
organizational case studies. To understand and depict how these organizations view
themselves, I use the organizations’ websites and other primary source materials
wherever possible. I also utilize journal articles and other recent literature that help fill in
the gaps to depict changes within these three organizations.

Roadmap
In the following chapter, I conduct a literature review that provides the theoretical
framework for my argument surrounding the significant changes to American Jewish
organizational life since the 2016 election through contextualizing these changes among
the previously existing trends and divisions within American Jewish politics. Chapter
three discusses how the positive and negative Jewish responses to recent changes in
Jewish Israel-politics are representative of Jews’ excitement or anxiety at aspects of their
faith being influenced by the modern world. I also explore the differences between
Jewish Israel-related organizations, present a framework to differentiate between three
groups of organizations, and delve into three case study organizations. Chapter four then
analyzes how changes within American political culture have directly impacted AIPAC,
IfNotNow, and J Street. I look at how broad changes within American politics have
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affected mainstream politics and public opinion on Israel, and in turn how this has
impacted each organizations’ ability to mobilize American Jews and promote their own
belief system regarding the American Jewish relationship to Israel.
My conclusion argues that the three case studies illuminate the very apparent and
recent changes to American Jewish life. These changes were a result of previously
existing trends, including generational differences, that were then accelerated by the 2016
election. These shifts in political opinions and representation need to be recognized and
grappled with by American Jewish leaders. These effects are also significant on
American politics by serving as an example of how the 2016 election affected minority,
religious, and affinity groups.
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2
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Introduction
My thesis explores the research question: How have fundamental changes in
America’s political culture shaped American Jews’ political stances and affected the
representation of viewpoints within American Jewish interest groups? This research
query views the recent changes within American political life as an independent variable.
I seek to understand to what extent this variable has catalyzed changes within Jewish
political culture. In particular, I discern to what extent the changes in American politics
since the 2016 election have affected American organizational life, such as catalyzing
membership growth in certain organizations or creating challenges to an organization’s
values. Exploring changes within American Jewish organizations helps indicate that one
or both of the following phenomena have occurred: first, that American Jewish political
viewpoints are evolving; second, that American Jews have mobilized into new and
diverse organizations that better represent the diversity of viewpoints.
This chapter examines the extent to which the existing debates in literature
recognize these changes and what theories are presented and deployed to explain why
those changes occurred. While some authors, consistent with the argument developed in
this thesis, point to Trump as an important catalyst of change within American Jewish
life, others either reject or question that there have been any changes altogether. Much of
the literature points to other variables as responsible for effecting American Jewish life,

20

such as a fundamental change in the Jewish condition or prioritization of liberal values.
While these variables were necessary preconditions, the rise of Trump was a key catalyst
of this effect. My empirical analysis in later chapters of organizational changes
contributes to current debates by presenting evidence that the election of Trump, and the
subsequent political polarization and progressive protests in response his election,
furthered previously existing schisms and trends within Jewish American politics. This
chapter provides an exhaustive literature review to describe how prominent authors
understand the extent to which changes have occurred and the variable responsible for
these changes.
Argument
There is minimal survey data that presents evidence for or against the fact that
American Jews’ political opinions or willingness to mobilize regarding Israel has
changed over time; however, recent challenges and/or growth since 2016 within three
prominent American Jewish organizations engaged from many angles in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict illustrates how the 2016 election catalyzed changes in American
Jewish political life. American political trends—among them the rise of Trump, political
polarization, and schisms within the Democratic party—should not be interpreted as
solely responsible for these changes but rather should be understood as having
accelerated what were already existing variables and discord within American Jewish life
previously. These variables are elaborated further within this chapter and demonstrate the
already existing features at play prior to the 2016 election.
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Distancing
This section examines the debate around whether there have been significant
changes to American Jewish life, specifically whether American Jews are becoming more
distanced from Israel. These works frame a response to my research question around a
shifting Jewish attachment to Israel. Later in this chapter, I explore this research question
from an angle that does not place attachment to Israel at the center, but rather understands
how a shift in values contributed to overall changes to American Jewish life today.
For decades, American Jews have debated the meaning, significance, and
potential consequence of the data that shows that “American Jews, especially younger
ones, are becoming less attached to Israel” (Waxman 2017, 179). American Jewish
sociologists have presented two “distancing hypothesis” concerning this phenomenon
that question the extent to which American “distancing from Israel has or has not been
occurring in American Jewish society” (Sheskin 2012, 27). I have chosen to explore these
“distancing” hypotheses as they are the lens through which existing literature has
approached my research question, thereby helping to place my argument in conversation
with existing literature.
The first hypothesis, or “life-cycle” effect, states that younger Jews are less
attached than older Jews, yet as they grow older they will become more attached, thus
mitigating any future changes in the total overall attachment (Sasson, Phillips, Wright,
Kadushin, and Saxe 2012, 67). This relies on the basic assumption that as we age “our
political attitudes and behavior change in highly predictable ways—we become more
conservative, clannish, and concerned with our immediate (and primordial) community”
(Barnett 2016, 204).
22

The second hypothesis, or “generational effect,” disagrees with the first
hypothesis; rather it argues that the younger generation will not grow in their attachment
over time, thereby leading to an overall future decrease in the attachment to Israel
(Sheskin 2012, 27). These hypotheses frame the differences in attachment between
younger and older generations as either a “life-cycle” or “generational” effect (Sasson,
Phillips, Wright, Kadushin, and Saxe 2012, 67).
The Life-Cycle Effect
While there is a range of surveys and polls that show that American Jewish
attachment to Israel has remained relatively stagnant, the reliability and accuracy of this
data is questionable. Prominent American Jewish sociologists, including Theodore
Sasson, Leonard Saxe, and others, have argued that a “preponderance of evidence
supports the view that emotional attachment to Israel increased over the life course rather
than declined across the generations” (Sasson, Phillips, Wright, Kadushin, and Saxe
2012, 67). The Pew Research Center 2013 Survey and the 2000 National Jewish
Population Survey discussed earlier does provide findings that align with this hypothesis,
illustrating that young American Jews showed less attachment than that of those older
generations at the time.
I agree with Michael Barnett that the data regarding distancing has “real
limitations” (Waxman 2018, 475). Barnett points to the difficulties in understanding what
it means for a respondent to describe themselves as pro-Israel or anti-Israel, as there is a
broad diversity of positions that could fall into either of these categories, regarding the
peace process, settlement expansion, Israeli security, the right for Palestinian statehood,
and the list continues (Waxman 2018, 475). Moreover, I second Barnett’s appeal to
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question the reliability of survey data in general on this topic, for the results can be easily
changed or manipulated depending upon question-wording, sequencing, and the overall
survey pool (Waxman 2018, 475).
My organizational analyses in chapters three and four provide evidence against
the life-cycle effect. My analysis confirms the generational hypothesis—that young
American Jews have and continue to grow more distant from Israel over time. Survey
data alone cannot prove that the first hypothesis is true. However, the growth of Jewish
progressive and center-left movements, founded by and/or engaging young Jewish
Americans, reveal that this generation of young Jewish Americans is fundamentally
different than those from previous generations. By drawing upon an organization analysis
as opposed to survey data, my thesis helps to disprove the first hypothesis. The
generational effect has been furthered by changes within American politics since 2016.
The later sections in this chapter regarding the unique attributes young Jewish
Americans, as well as an increasingly fractured Israeli American relationship and vision
for a Jewish future, also serve as evidence that young American Jews will not increase
their attachment to Israel with age.
The next subsection describes the primary differences in generational memories
between older and younger generations of American Jews today that are likely
responsible for ‘distancing;’ the next section about young Jewish Americans today, also
contributes evidence that this generation is fundamentally different from those
generations that came before it, meaning that their attachment to Israel will not increase
with time.
Generational memories
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The different generational memories are partially responsible for distancing in
emotional attachment to Israel. Sociologists who support the “generational” hypothesis
believe that the age-related difference is bound to lead to an “intergenerational decline;”
the eldest generation will inevitably be replaced by those generations that come after it
(Cohen and Kelman 2007, 2). Moreover, not only will there be an inevitable replacement,
but also that future generations do not share the same lived experiences and memories of
those generations prior.
The oldest generations are most familiar with a narrative of Judaism surrounding
victimhood because they are more likely to have been present during periods of overt
discrimination, such as the Holocaust, and the formation of Israel in 1948. Their
experience of Israel is most clearly defined by a long history of Jewish persecution
culminating in the 19th-century tragedy of the Holocaust. According to a 2012 survey, 68
percent of American Jews aged over sixty describes the Holocaust as a very important
Jewish experience that has impacted political beliefs, compared to the 41 percent of
American Jews aged between 18 to 39 who agree (Jones and Cox 2012, 7). Thus,
American Jews who were born before World War II, or in its aftermath, have an
understanding of Judaism that has been shaped by suffering from violent and prevalent
anti-Semitism. Many see the founding of the modern state of Israel as a redemption from
the previous state of wandering and uncertainty about their survival. For members of the
Baby Boomer generation, their opinions of Israel have been shaped by memories of the
Six-Day War in 1967 in which Israel succeeded in fighting five of its neighbors. The
1967 war also served as an important turning point in American Jewish history; it is
widely assumed to be the “high-water mark of American Jewry’s support for Israel”
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(Barnett 2016, 199). These memories shape the perceptions of Israel for the oldest
generations today, continuing to view Israel as the underdog ‘David’ from the biblical
story of David and Goliath.
Meanwhile, the youngest generations of American Jews hold very different
memories of Israel. While many have been exposed to the narratives of the generations
prior through Jewish youth institutions, such as day schools, youth groups, and Sunday
schools, they have not lived through similar historical experiences as generations prior.
Daniel Gordis, an American-born Israeli thinker, wrote in his recent book We Stand
Divided about the incredible differences between how young American Jews came
together during times of conflict in Israel during the 1970s versus today. For example, he
juxtaposed his experiences as a child at a Jewish summer camp in 1976 during the
hijacking of an Air France plane on route from Tel Aviv to Paris with that of the critical
response from a group of young Jews during the 2014 war. In 1976, hundreds of campers
gathered together to celebrate when Israel’s strong-armed response to the hijacking led to
the release of 102 of 106 hostages (Gordis 2019, 11-12). Likewise, in the summer of
2014, during the violence of Operation Protective Edge, a group of young American Jews
(that would later form the organization IfNotNow) came together to demand that Israel
“stop the war on Gaza, end the occupation, and freedom and dignity of all;” as Gordis
points out, their demands had no mention of the simultaneously occurring Hamas-led war
on Israel (Gordis 2019, 12-13).
Sociologists Steven Cohen and Ari Kelman described the events that likely
shaped the memories Jews born in the years following 1974: The First Lebanon War in
1982, the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, and the Second Lebanon War. Cohen and
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Kelman argue that the moral and political complexity of these events means that younger
generations are thus “less likely to cast Israel in a positive, let alone heroic light” (Cohen
and Kelman 2007, 3). Moreover, the lack of clear, genuine, and believable efforts at
creating peace in Israel-Palestine may also shape the youngest generation’s memories.
Although there were some efforts at creating peace and stability, such as Camp David II
in 2000, these efforts have all largely failed, and have often devolved into violence,
particularly with the Second Intifada from late 2000 through 2005. As Jonathan Weisman
described, “younger American Jews do not typically remember Israel as the David
against regional Goliaths. They see a bully, armed and indifferent, 45 years past the Yom
Kippur War, the last conflict that threatened Israel’s existence” (Weisman 2019). Gordis
similarly echoed that they have known no other Israel than that of the “start-up nation”:
“powerful, stable, (seemingly) invulnerable…the reason that the Palestinians live such
unfortunate lives” (Gordis 2019, 33).

Young Jewish Americans Today
Beyond distinct generational memories, the recent changes to American Jewish
life are a product of the major demographic differences between young American Jews
and older generations. While there are several distinguishable differences, among the
most impactful are the much higher rates of intermarriage in Jewish society, the
multifaceted technological capabilities that have shaped the way people interact and gain
knowledge, and, most importantly, the embrace of liberal values.2 Many of these distinct
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Although these differences have been most impactful to the youngest generations of
American Jews, their effect has not solely been limited to the youngest population.
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qualities are also limited to non-Orthodox Jews who make up around 89% of the Jewish
population under 30 (Pew Research Center 2013, 49).
Young American Jews today live in both a Jewish and secular society dissimilar
to that of generations prior. Overall, Jewish communities have followed in the footsteps
of broader American society and have grown more secular—an outcome that is likely
both the product and the result of higher rates of intermarriage. Since the 1970s, rates of
intermarriage among Jews have increased dramatically; between 2005 and 2013, nearly
six-in-ten of the net American Jewish population married a non-Jewish spouse, compared
to just 17% before 1970. Intermarriage has occurred almost exclusively in non-Orthodox
communities as only 2% have a non-Jewish spouse (Pew Research Center 2013, 9). As a
result, younger American Jews today are much more likely than the generation of their
parents to be from a family of intermarried parents. Waxman describes how this has
“undoubtedly” impacted the young American Jews whose parents are intermarried: they
are more liberal and significantly less attached to Israel (Waxman 2016, 137).
The rapid technological innovations available to Jewish Americans at a young age
are also a primary generational difference. They not only have quick and easy access to
information but also are exposed to a wide variety of viewpoints through social media.
Social media platforms also make it easier for people across the country or world to
connect with one another and share ideas. In the past, the information that youths might
receive about issues, such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, would have been more limited.
Without the depth and breadth of easily accessible information online, it was more
difficult to question the narrative that the Jewish establishment shared about Israel. Since
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a widely contested issue today, one does not have to look far
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or hard to find a multitude of opinions. American Jewish organizations, particularly those
with a young and liberal membership, have used social media to their advantage.
Organizations can harness social media as a tool to not only share their ideas but also to
reach and mobilize individuals who they otherwise would have difficulty connecting
with. By making it easier to share content, advertise for events, and gain membership,
social media has played a role in helping to revolutionize American Jewish life.
Young Jewish Americans’ liberal political views have also largely affected their
perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The overall Jewish population is nearly
twice as liberal as the total United States population. Even still, young Jewish adults are
more liberal and less conservative than older cohorts. According to a 2019 Jewish
electorate study at Brandeis, Jews ages 18-34 were 50% liberal and only 14%
conservative, compared to Jews ages 65+ who are 36% liberal and 27% conservative
(Saxe, Tighe, Kramer, Parmer, Nussbaum, Kallista, and Seabrum 2019). In fact, young
American Jews are more liberal than non-Jewish Americans of the same age.
Many of the factors mentioned have also made young American Jews more
acquainted with and sympathetic to the Palestinian narrative. Social media has helped
expose American Jews to Palestinian’s perspective. Yet, the most important aspect is
young Jewish American’s largely liberal identity. Today’s most widespread and
successful social justice movements—from the Women’s March to Black Lives Matter—
use “intersectional activism,” meaning that they support “a wide variety of issues,
including discrimination by sex, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, nationality,
disability, religion and other marginalized statuses” (Heany 2019). Among intersectional
issues is support for the Palestinian people’s struggle for freedom, justice, and equality
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through the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS). BDS is a highly controversial
movement, particularly on college campuses, that works to “end international support for
Israel's oppression of Palestinians and pressure Israel to comply with international law”
(BDS 2020). For American Jews who also are pro-Israel, supporting these social
movements means grappling with how the BDS movement aligns with their other values.
The many differences mentioned that make young Jewish Americans’ identity and
experiences fundamentally different from generations prior presents evidence against the
first distancing hypothesis, or the Life-Cycle Effect. Beyond the generational distinctions
discussed in this section, American and Israeli Jewish communities have groups that are
increasingly disparate. This trend is interlinked with the growing generational differences
between younger and older Americans such that the increasingly liberal beliefs, secular
practices, and universalist perception of Jewish life have come into conflict with Israeli
Jews’ religious, cultural, and political sentiments.

“Twin Portraits”: American and Israeli Jews
The changes within the American Jewish community are not solely internal;
rather, they are a product of the growing divide between American and Israeli Jews.
Among recent literature, many authors have approached the changes within American
Jewish life through the lens of a struggling relationship between American and Israeli
Jews today. For example, Alon Pinkas’ article titled “Sorry Israel, US Jewry just isn’t
that into you” described the waning of a 30 year “love affair” (Pinkas 2017, 1). After
serving for 30 years as a unifying cause, the reign of a unique Israeli-American
relationship has grown precarious. American Jews’ embrace of liberal values stands at

30

odds with the “intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” decades of occupation, and an
Israeli dismissal of Reform and Conservative identity, an identity that comprises 80% of
the American Jewish community (Pinkas 2017, 2).
Two recent books similarly echo the role of Israel in an American Jewish divide.
Daniel Gordis’ (2019) book We Stand Divided argued that the “split between American
Jews and Israel was causing a split within the American Jewish community” (Gordis
2019, 21). While one group of American Jews has grown “exasperated” with Israel,
another group of “right-of-center” American Jews has grown “exasperated” with the first
group, creating internal American Jewish conflict. Dov Waxman’s (2016) book Trouble
in the Tribe shares similar concerns, exploring the increasingly contentious place of Israel
within American Jewish society. The recent polarization within American Jewish life
stems from a growing group of American Jews disenfranchised and dissatisfied with
Israel’s right-wing policies, especially as it relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
treatment of the Palestinian people.
The ideological differences between the two largest Jewish population centers
plays a central role in this divide. The personal affinity or ‘bond’ between the two groups
should not be ignored; nearly 4-in-10 American Jews have visited at least once, and many
with family spanning the two nations. Nonetheless, the two populations live in vastly
different societies. Unlike their American Jewish counterparts who are approximately
50% liberal, nearly 4-in-10 Israeli Jews identify as politically right-wing (Pew Research
Center 2013, 96). American Jews live in a diverse and majority-Christian society,
whereas Israeli Jews live in a majority Jewish population (Pew Research Center 2017).
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The Pew Research Center’s 2017 “Twin Portraits” also demonstrated the two group’s
diverging understandings of what being Judaism means to them:
Americans are far more likely than Israelis to say that pursuing ethics,
morality and justice in society, as well as displaying “intellectual curiosity” and
having a “good sense of humor,” are essential to what being Jewish means to
them. Israeli Jews, meanwhile, more commonly highlight observance of Jewish
law and a connection to Jewish history, culture or community (Pew Research
Center 2017).
The differing religious affiliations are also an important distinction. As discussed
in chapter 1, nearly half of American Jews affiliate as Conservative or Reform; both
affiliations’ religious practices are designed to accommodate living and socializing in the
modern-day and outside of the Jewish community. Although half of Israeli Jewish society
is secular, non-Orthodox American Jews hold religious, cultural, and political beliefs that
clash with the other half of Israeli Jews made up of Masorti (traditional), Dati (religious
Zionists), or Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews. For example, the Datiim holds political views
that “entwine religious identity and nationalism,” “identify with the right [wing], to favor
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and to say Arabs should be expelled or transferred
from Israel” (Pew Research Center 2017).
The conflict between American Jews and Israel as well as that within Jewish
American society can be understood as a quarrel over two visions of how Jews exist in
the world. As presented in the introduction, the opposing values of “particularism” and
“universalism” create different movements and visions of what it means to be a Jew. This
same conflict of values is wrapped up in the state of Israel’s history and laws. Defined as
a Jewish, democratic state, Israel’s politics and identity travels between two poles: a
homeland for the Jewish people and a thriving western ‘democracy.’ In recent years, the
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pendulum has swung closer towards a particularistic Jewish vision for Israel. One
example that depicts this trend is that, in 2018, the Israeli government passed the nationstate law, protecting and guaranteeing the democratic rights of only its Jewish citizens.
For the parts of American Jewish society that support a “universalist” vision of Judaism
defined by support for diversity and freedom for all, Israel’s actions and policies stand
opposed to their values. As Gordis describes, “it is, in short, not an Israel they can love or
support. If anything, it is Israel that they must resist” (Gordis 2019, 25). American Jewish
differences are therefore fueled by disagreeing values and are only furthered as Israel
takes ‘particularistic actions’ that directly affect a potential future Israeli-Palestinian
peace process.
The broad diversity of practices and beliefs within both American and Israeli
populations means that it is difficult to understand how and if these two groups are
moving closer or further apart. However, this section, and the section prior regarding
young Jewish Americans, presents evidence that the Israeli-American relationship is
evolving. The connection between these two factors—the growing generational
differences of young Jewish Americans and dissimilar experiences of American and
Israeli Jews—can not and should not be ignored. American Jews (particularly younger
populations) increasing criticism and dissatisfaction with Israeli policies, Israeli Jews’
particularistic interpretation of Judaism, and American Jewish systems that lend
unwavering support to the Israeli government indicate that broader changes to American
Jewish life have begun to take form.
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What Changes Have Taken Place?
Two factors serve as a precondition for the changes in American Jewish life
today: first, young Jewish Americans live in a world different than generations prior;
Second, Israeli and American visions of Judaism are continuously growing apart. The
fundamental changes within American politics since 2016 do not serve as the cause of the
changes to American Jewish life today; rather the multitude of ways in which American
politics has evolved—provoking widespread polarization, evoking a left-progressive
divide within the Democratic Party, reshaping altogether the values of the Republic Party,
and shaping diplomatic norms around the American Presidency—has brought forward the
already existing variables of change within American Jewish political life, particularly on
the issue of Israel. Prior to 2016, new and alternative organizations were already founded
and growing in popularity. Nonetheless, alterations to American politics, leading to the
rise and popularity of progressive movements and leaders as well as the decreasing
popularity of bipartisanship, accelerated the growth and popularity of left-leaning
movements and challenged group’s ability to maintain bipartisanship.
Since these trends started far before the rise of Trump, and were instead
accelerated by the 2016 election, American Jewish political thinkers have long debated
and upheld disagreeing visions that describe how and to what extent decreasing American
Jewish attachment to Israel has taken place. While some authors believe that young
American Jews’ criticism of Israel and their increasing disinterest in traditional
institutions with pro-Israel policies indicates a culture of indifference, others point to this
criticism as a sign that young Jewish Americans are continuing to engage with Israel but
in new and critical ways. While these theories represent the changing attachments for
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some groups of young Jews, they do not fully encapsulate what is happening in rapidly
growing progressive Jewish movements, particularly IfNotNow. This section will
compare these two initial theories with Atalia Omer’s argument in Days of Awe:
Reimagining Jewishness in Solidarity with Palestinians. Omer’s theory best illustrates
how the root of criticism from the Jewish far left and progressive movements today stems
from an “indignation against injustice done in their name” by Israel, and how communal
protests for Palestinian Solidarity have led to a reimagination of Jewishness (Omer 2019).
Growing criticism of Israel stems from a reimagination of Jewishness with the value of
social justice at the center informing their solidarity with Palestinians. Each of these three
theories presents an important part of the picture surrounding the most pertinent changes
to American Jewish life today.
Indifference
The first theory understands the changes within American Jewish life as a result
of the growing culture of indifference towards Israel among young Jews. One proponent
is Peter Beinart, a professor of journalism and political science at the City University of
New York. In his much discussed and highly controversial New York Review of Books
article “The Failure of the American Jewish establishment,” Beinart presented evidence
that young American Jews have grown indifferent to Israel. He began the article by
pointing to a 2003 study by pollster Frank Luntz who was hired by Jewish philanthropies
to explain why Jewish college students were not more “vigorously rebutting campus
criticism of Israel” (Beinart 2010, 1). Luntz’s study found that in the six times that Jewish
youth were brought together to talk about their Jewishness and connection to Israel, every
time “the topic of Israel did not come up until it was prompted. Six times these Jewish
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youth used the word ‘they’ rather than ‘us’ to describe the situation” (quoted in Beinart
2010). By drawing upon this study and others, Beinart sought to lend support for his
theory that there is a growing culture of indifference to Israel among young Jews.
Beinart also claimed that major American Jewish organizations’ refusal to defend
democracy in the Jewish state is alienating many young liberal Jews from Zionism
itself—a point elaborated in his 2012 book The Crisis of Zionism. The policies of
organizations like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations, according to Beinart, are responsible for this effect. The establishment’s
policy of ‘blanket’ support for Israel stands opposed to young Jews liberal vision of
Zionism—a vision that both upholds democratic ideals and serves as a safeguard for the
Jewish people—and their desire for an “open and frank” discussion surrounding how this
vision falls short.
I agree with Beinart that the heart of this disagreement is rooted in the “defining
values of American Jewish political culture,” these being “a belief in open debate, a
skepticism about military force, [and] a commitment to human rights” (Beinart 2010).
However, I believe that describing the effect of such policies as a growing culture of
indifference does not fully encapsulate the changes to American Jewish life today.
Instead, I believe that young Jews’ embrace of liberal values, and the conflict of these
values with establishment policies, have inspired many different types of reactions. These
different types of reactions can be seen through the formation of organizations that run
counter to the traditional center-right- and right-wing establishment organizations’
policies. The following subsections on critical engagement and Jewish reimagination,
and the examples presented within my case study chapters of many types of Jewish
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organizations, illustrate how the increasing prominence of liberal values have inspired
several reactions among American Jews today.
Critical Engagement
While Dov Waxman agrees with Beinart that Jewish organizations serve as
“intellectual bodyguards for Israeli leaders who threaten the very liberal values they
profess to admire” (Beinart 2016, 1), he disagrees with Beinart’s assessment of how
American Jews have reacted. Waxman does not believe that “young American Jews are
emotionally detached and disconnected from Israel” (Waxman 2017). Waxman (2017)
instead argues that young Jews are actually “more engaged with Israel than their
predecessors,” yet are also more critical. He believes that criticism should be viewed as a
form of engagement, not disengagement. (Waxman 2017, 177). Waxman describes these
changes as a form of ‘critical engagement’ with Israel and argues that it is a manifestation
of “attachment, not alienation” with Israel (Waxman 2017, 181).
Waxman’s critical engagement argument can be contextualized by evidence that,
for American Jews, criticism of Israel is not an entirely new nor unaccepted phenomenon.
The 2013 Pew Research Center poll found that 89% of the net Jewish population
surveyed believed that being strongly critical of Israel is compatible with being Jewish
(Pew Research Center 2013, 58). Moreover, Jews overall, not only the youngest
population, have grown more critical of Israel: 42% of American Jews said that Trump
favors Israel too much, a number far greater than is true for Catholics and Christians
(Smith 2019). Waxman points to similar reasons to those mentioned in my section on
Young American Jews as to why younger generations have grown more critical, arguing
that young Jews are more liberal, more oriented towards universalism than older
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generations, that the Holocaust and anti-Semitism have had less of an impact on their
lives, and that they hold different “generational” memories (Waxman 2017, 178). The
growing differences between Israel and America, described in the Twin Portraits Section,
are also responsible for growing criticism.
While I agree with Waxman that for some American Jews criticism has been a
form of engagement, I believe that these changes have more to do with the increasing
central importance of tikkun olam, and less to do with attachment to Israel. Growing
criticism of Israel by young Jews’ should be primarily understood not through the lens of
‘love’ or ‘care’ for Israel (or critical engagement) but rather should be construed as
rooted in an embrace of Jewish values of universalism and practice of tikkun olam, or
repairing the world. American Jews’ growing criticism of Israel are a product of the
liberal values that compels them to do so, as opposed to an attachment to the holy land.
Michael Barnett’s (2016) The Stars and the Stripes provides a foundation to
understand the historical roots of tikkun olam and its increasing importance to American
Jewish identity today. Barnett describes how, prior to 1960, the term tikkun olam was
hardly mentioned. The term started circulating starting in 1970 and, in the decades
following, became incorporated into Conservative Judaism’s statement of principles, as
well as in the 1990s became well-known in Jewish households across America. Tikkun
olam differs from other similar Jewish terms like tzedakah, or justice, that are “often
associated with giving to one’s own,” for it is generally assumed to refer to “giving to
non-Jews” (Barnett 2016, 219). This differentiates the former action as closer in line with
cosmopolitanism and the later with tribal values (Barnett 2016, 219)
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Reimagination of Jewishness
Omer’s argument builds upon existing literature that demonstrates how tikkun
olam now serves a more central role today among American Jews by researching how
young Jews’ liberal values have led them to Palestinian Solidarity, ultimately resulting in
a reimagination of their Jewishness. Omer conducted sociological research through
interviews with 70 Jewish American Palestinian solidarity activists, engaged across four
progressive Jewish activist groups—Open Hillel, INN, Center for Jewish Non-violence,
and Jewish Voices for Peace. Omer found that Jewish Palestinian Solidarity movements
are both the outcome of changes in American Jewish life, as well as serve as a continuous
catalyst for the rethinking of a transformation of what it means to be Jewish. Her theory
goes beyond Waxman and Beinart to understand decreasing attachment to Israel instead
around the growth of liberal values among young Jewish Americans.
All three theories discussed provide an important piece to the larger picture of
what is happening in American Jewish life today. Young American Jews today are far
less willing to accept the establishment’s narrative around Israel. They instead seek to
openly discuss where and how Israel’s policies (and their American backing by American
politicians and Jewish leaders) fall short of a vision of a liberal, democratic Jewish state.
Young Jews are much more willing and open than preceding generations to criticize the
Jewish state in these ways. This is likely due to a broad combination of factors including
generational differences, liberal values, and Israel’s much more privileged and powerful
position today. While some Jews certainly have grown indifferent to Israel, and others
criticize Israel out of love, the most interesting and significant trend that has arisen is the
increasing presence and growth of Jewish social justice and Palestinian solidarity
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movements. The growth of these movements is interesting for two reasons. First, they
constitute a new trend in American Jewish life with relation to attachment to Israel.
Second, the rise of these Jewish anti-occupation movements has also contributed to new
forms of Jewish practice and life through integrating religious and cultural practices into
their activism.
I will build upon these insights to do an empirical analysis of recent changes in
the organizational life of American Jews. My case studies depict the extent to which
changes in American politics have contributed, effected, or motivated trends towards
indifference, critical engagement, and/or the reimagination of Jewishness through
Palestinian solidarity activism. I argue that political trends in the United States since 2016
towards party polarization and internal shifts within the Democratic party have
challenged the establishment institution’s ability to appeal to young progressive Jews.
Changes in American politics have also encouraged some young Jewish Americans to
critically engage with Israel through “Liberal Zionist” organizations or to engage in
Palestinian Solidarity activism through “Anti-Occupation” organizations.

Conclusion
This chapter responded to the longstanding debate among American Jewish
intellectuals and community members surrounding whether young American Jews are
distancing themselves from Israel or growing less attached. I have shown that a number
of factors have led young Jews today to embrace a universalist vision of Judaism—a
vision that is compatible with and motivates their liberal identities and tikkun olam
actions. Young Jews not only grew up in a world vastly different than older generations
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but also the position Israel holds on the international stage has evolved dramatically from
an underdog to a powerful, and often aggressive, state. These interconnected factors
make it highly unlikely that, with age, younger generations’ attachment to Israel will
grow over time. Instead the impact of these factors, in conjunction with recent changes in
American politics, requires further examination.
Many American Jewish sociologists and political scientists have begun to
recognize that changes are occurring and have questioned what this change looks like.
This chapter presented three theories that seek to describe and understand how American
Jewish life has changed: a growing culture of indifference surrounding Israel, engaging
with Israel through criticism, or mobilizing against Israel for Palestinian Solidarity. Each
of these theories is significant, painting just one part of a larger image of the many
different reactions that have taken place. Despite different understandings of how
American Jewish life is changing, all three theories to some extent—and especially Atalia
Omer—recognize young Jews’ embrace of liberal values as central to transformations in
Jewish attachment to Israel. In the chapters following, I depict how recent changes within
American political life, specifically the rise of Trump, have impacted different segments
of American Jewish life.
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3
Jewish Organizational Life
Introduction
To understand the changes within American Jewish life today, I examine Jewish
organizational life and history to provide a context and background that helps depict the
recent changes and the diversity of internal organizational responses. While this chapter
begins by broadly discussing the vast number and diversity of American Jewish
organizations, later I narrow in by delving deeper into organizations whose mission and
purpose relates to Israel and/or the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. I present a framework of
Israel-related American Jewish organizations to elucidate the similarities and differences
between three groups of organizations. Each case study organization represents a larger
group of similarly minded institutions, so this chapter presents the history and
background of the three case study organizations—AIPAC, IfNotNow, and J Street—to
set the stage for analysis within chapter four.

Organizational Life
American Jewish organizational life has a rich history and diversity, and today is
made up of over 17,500 organizations (Barnett 2016, 40). Among these organizations are
a broad spectrum of missions, purposes, members, and other distinguishing factors,
providing spaces for the similarly diverse spectrum of American Jews’ political,
religious, and cultural beliefs. One way to break down these organizations is to look at
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the distinct purposes they serve in Jewish communities across America. Some
organizations serve a primarily religious role, others provide volunteer opportunities,
function as a cultural home, engage youth, or fight against anti-Semitism, among others.
The American Jewish Yearbook (AJYB) serves as a helpful analytical tool,
annually “document[ing] the institutional infrastructure of the North American Jewish
community” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 579). The AJYM systematically categorizes
the nearly 800 national Jewish organizations into 40+ categories: Denominational, AgeRelated (Adult, Youth, Children, and College Aged), Israel-Related PhilanthropyPromoting, Holocaust, Academic, Fraternities/Sororities, National Origin, Social
Welfare, among others (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 579-580). Although each
organization is placed into a specific category, the editors’ note states that “many
organizations could easily fit in multiple categories” and that the “inclusion of an
organization does not imply that the editors share the viewpoints espoused by that
organization” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 281).
The editors’ note and the vast number overall of national organizations illustrates
two trends in American Jewish life today. First, American Jewish organizations often
play a multitude of roles in the lives of Jewish individuals. For example, a Jewish
Denomination organization, like the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism or
Union for Reform Judaism, often provides a space not only for prayer, but also engages
its members in a wide range of cultural practices; it likely also promotes a particular set
of beliefs and values around what it means to live a Jewish life, such as praying in
Synagogue every Saturday or supporting Israel. Second, while there are an extensive
number of organizations, some of these organizations are more or less accepted among
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traditional and mainstream Jews and Jewish institutions. For example, mainstream
organizations may reject the practices of newer and/or unconventional organizations, for
they do not view these organizations practices or beliefs as essentially Jewish. Likewise,
members of newer and/or unconventional organizations may similarly reject or criticize
the practices of more traditional American Jewish organizations. This disagreement is
part of a larger debate among American Jewish sociologists and scholars as to whether
modern adaptations of traditional religious, cultural, and political modern are positive or
negative changes. This lack of consensus is important to my research on American
Jewish interest groups, for American Jews espouse conflicting beliefs as to whether the
growing number of Israel-related interest groups, which disagree with traditional
American Jewish institutions, are a beneficial development.
Tradition versus Transformation
The disagreement as to whether recent changes within American Jewish
organizational life are positive or negative applies directly to my research question,
informing much of the debate around whether the substance of American Jewish life is
weakening or strengthening upon its encounter with the modern world. Over the last six
years, far-left leaning groups have emerged that disagree with the views of traditional
American Jewish interest groups who see supporting Israel as an essential Jewish
practice. The growth or mobilization of these groups has sparked controversy
surrounding what light to view these evolving and modern American Jewish practices.
Later in this chapter, I present a framework that will depict how three different and
disagreeing camps of American Jewish Israel-related organizations promote either
breaking or keeping with tradition.
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Traditionalists and transformationalists disagree as to whether evolving Jewish
life and practices to the modern world is good or bad. Traditionalists see the modern
world as “inherently threatening to Judaism;” interactions with other cultures have led to
new forms and practices that stray from or disagree with essential forms of Jewishness
(Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 10). Meanwhile, transformationalists look more favorably
on how the conditions of the modern world impacts Judaism, providing the opportunity
for “developing new forms of Judaism and Jewishness” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019,
10). These different world views mean that traditionalists and transformationalists
“derive very different conclusions from the same facts” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 8).
Transformationalists take an optimistic approach to changes in American Jewish life. For
example, they do not see declines in Jewish involvement as a reason to worry; modern
substitutes have replaced Jewish practices of the past provide an opportunity and thus are
not a reason for despair. Meanwhile, traditionalists are worried when they see trends that
Jews are “direction of less Jewish intensiveness, of greater integration into American
society, and of more remoteness from other Jews, ritual practice, and organized Jewry”
(Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 10). They believe pessimistically that trends of
disengagement from traditional forms of Jewish organization and ritual practice
constitute a threat to the authentic practice of Judaism.
The traditionalist and transformationalist interpretations provide a broader
structure to understand disagreement among American Jews over how to approach the
development of new organizations and forms of Jewish practice. Traditionalists would
look negatively upon evidence of a diversifying body of organizations, whereas
transformationalists would look optimistically upon these changes as an opportunity to
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develop new Jewish practices and forms. My thesis specifically seeks to understand how
recent changes in American political culture have affected American Jewish political life.
The two interpretations of traditionalism and transformationalism are relevant to my
research question, for they constitute the two opposing American Jewish reactions to
evidence that American Jewish life today is evolving in response to changes stemming
from the secular, outside world.

Israel-related organizations
This section narrows on Jewish Israel-related organizations within American
Jewish life and presents a framework by which to categorize the growing diversity of
organizations. When modern Jewish American pro-Israel interest groups were founded
around the late 1960s there was very little diversity in viewpoints among these
organizations. Over time, many new organizations were founded which espouse views
that often disagreed with the more traditional and mainstream institutions by engaging
more critically with Israel. This section discusses how these newer organizations differ
from the older and traditional mainstream organizations. I then classify American Jewish
Israel-related organizations into three categories.
The mobilization and growth of newer organizations, particularly those on the farleft who publicly criticize Israel, play an important role in shaping the power dynamic
between American Jewish interest groups, challenging the power of the more traditional
American Jewish establishment. Whereas transformationalists would look kindly upon
these challenges to the status quo by new organizations who reform their practices to fit
with the modern world, traditionalists would interpret challenge to traditional institutions
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as “inherently threatening to Judaism” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 10). To understand
how new organizations have questioned the status of quo of American Jewish policy on
Israel, and the previously widespread consensus presented and promoted by
establishment organizations, I have empirically chosen to map Israel-related
organizations into three different categories. Within each category, I also present the
background, history, issues, and strategies of a respective case study organization.
The Erosion of Historical Consensus
For the nearly 50 years since the 1967 war there was an apparent unanimity on
Israel among the mainstream religious, cultural, and political American Jewish
organizations. Following the 1967 war, “Israel was the great unifying cause of American
Jewish politics,” bringing American Jews “physically and emotionally together” to march
in the streets, fundraise, and lobby their elected officials in support of Israel (Waxman
2016, 120). This sense of solidarity brought American Jews a sense of unity and purpose
that reigned across their religious, cultural and political communities. The 1967 War also
inspired a cultural transition among American Jews with Israel at the center. The sense of
having almost lost Israel entirely and the pride over the Jewish state’s victory
reconfigured the role of Israel in American Jewish identity. Saying the right things about
Israel became an unofficial requirement for American Jews to be accepted members of
the Jewish community (Liebman 1973, 92).
One institution in particular, the Conference of Presidents of Major American
Jewish Organizations (CoP), demonstrates how many organizations banded together to
create an apparent consensus on Jewish issues and, more specifically, support for Israel.
CoP encompasses fifty-one of the most prominent and powerful modern American
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Jewish organizations, among which are the largest national, denominational Jewish
organizations—the Orthodox Union, United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, and the
Union for Reform Judaism (Conference of Presidents 2019). Since sixty-three percent of
Jews today are denominationally Orthodox, Conservative or Reform, CoP therefore
harnesses a large amount of power through its organizational members (Pew Research
Center 2013, 10). The Conference also has member organizations whose primary
purposes are not religious or cultural, but rather are to promote pro-Israel policies and
strengthen the U.S. Israel relationship, such as the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA). While there has been some
diversity of viewpoints among member organizations, CoP joined together and continues
to unite member organizations to “advance the interests of the American Jewish
community, sustain broad-based support for Israel and address the critical concerns
facing world Jewry” (Conference of Presidents 2019). The larger institutions and many of
its member organizations continue to maintain significant support today.
While in the past Israel brought American Jews together, this phenomenon no
longer holds today; the American Jewish community’s conversations around Israel—and
particularly the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict—have grown increasingly divided. A new and
rising group of American Jews have mobilized around their beliefs, questioning Israel’s
actions within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leading to the creation of new organizations
that then better represent their viewpoints. The existence and growth of these
organizations (outside of the American Jewish establishment) call into question the
previously accepted norms around Jewish unanimous support for Israel and the power of
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establishment organizations to solely dictate American Jewish policy and public opinions
regarding Israel.
Mapping Organizations
This section will define and analyze the difference and similarities between
different camps of American Jewish Israel-related organizations.3 There are a range of
organizations that engage in many forms of Israel-related activities. The AJYB breaks
down Israel-related organizations into five categories: (1) Education, (2) Humanitarian,
(3) Political and Advocacy, (4) Supporting Specific Israeli Institutions, (5) and Other
(Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 580). My analysis will look primarily at the 60
organizations within the “Political and Advocacy” section as this directly relates to my
research question surrounding how recent changes in American politics have impacted
American Jews political stances and affected the representation of viewpoints within
American Jewish interest groups.
As I have developed in the following Table 2.1, American Jewish Political and
Advocacy Israel-Related organizations can be roughly broken up into three different
groups; each group upholds its own set of political beliefs, values, strategies, and
missions. The three groups span a political spectrum of right- to left-leaning
3

While some organizations do not necessarily describe themselves within their mission’s
as ‘Jewish,’ I consider them as Jewish for several reasons. Sociologists include these
organizations when categorizing the overall number of American Jewish organizations.
The editors of the American Jewish Year Book ascribe AIPAC, J Street, INN within the
Israel-related category of national American Jewish organizations. Moreover, both
AIPAC and J Street are connected to CoP: AIPAC is a member; and J Street applied for
membership yet was denied. As well, the vast majority of leadership, membership,
donors, and their partners of these organizations describe themselves as Jewish. I will
explore the explicitly Jewish nature, practices, and/or connections in the case study
chapters.
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organizations. The specific traits of each group are also not necessarily exclusive,
particularly since the Liberal Zionist group’s beliefs, issues, and strategies exist
somewhere along a spectrum between the “Establishment” and “Anti-Occupation”
camps.
Table 2.1: Mapping American Jewish Israel-Related Organizational Life: Three
Camps on Advocacy and Politics
Politicalleaning

Example

Zionism?

Values:
Universal
or
Particular?
4

ESTABLISHMENT
LIBERAL
ZIONISM

Centerand
far-right
Centerleft

ANTIFar-left
OCCUPAT and
ION
progressive

Who is at
fault for
beginning
and/or
perpetuatin
g the
IsraeliPalestinian
Conflict?
Palestine

Public
Jewish
Criticism
of Israel?

AIPAC

Good

Particular

J Street

Good, as
long as its
liberal
Bad or
neutral

Both

Israel and
Palestine

Yes

Universal

Israel

Yes

IfNotNow

No

Table 2.1 is also broadly based upon Dov Waxman’s “The Four Camps in the
American Jewish Debate about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” in Trouble in the Tribe

The category that distinguishes between universal and particular values is based upon
Michael Barnett’s explanation of trends in his book The Star and the Stripes. These
differences are described in the interest group section of chapter. Particularism or
“tribalism” understands the Jewish people as distinctly and uniquely situated in the
world. Universalism rather promotes to an obligation to care for all people around the
world, and not only other Jews.
4
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(Waxman 2016, 94). I have made changes to Waxman’s table by adding additional
distinguishing questions and renaming and consolidating organizational categories.
Whereas Waxman includes a fourth “Far-Right” category separate from the “Right”
camp, I have stylistically chosen not to distinguish between the two, as most of my
analysis and research focuses on the growing differences and conflict between the right
wing, center-left, and progressive organizations, and not between the Jewish center- and
far-right groups. Throughout the next three sections I elucidate the differences between
each group by presenting a case study organization that represents each camp.

AIPAC and the Establishment
The first group I will explore is the “Establishment” which is defined by its
particularistic interpretation of Judaism and is drawn to a version of Zionism that
recognizes the Jewish people’s unique connection to the land of Israel. Although
internally members of establishment organizations are engaged in debate regarding Israeli
politics, they also uphold clear ‘red lines’ leading them to reject organizations that
publicly criticize Israel’s policies, such as actions that are antithetical peace, occupation,
or treatment of the Palestinian people. With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
they do not believe Israel is at fault, but rather point to the violent actions of the
Palestinians as responsible for undermining peace.5 AIPAC will serve as my case study
for the American Jewish Establishment.
5

Far-right wing organizations share similar beliefs to the center-right wing camp that the
“predicament of Palestinians...is solely the fault of Palestinian and Arab leaders, for
which Israel bears no responsibility” (Waxman 2016, 97). Nonetheless, the further right
wing camp goes further than this to reject the Palestinian claim that they are the
indigenous inhabitants of the land (Waxman 2016, 97).
51

AIPAC has played an important role in shaping modern U.S. policy on Israel. The
organization was incorporated in 1963, fifteen years after the founding of the State of
Israel (Bruck 2014, paragraph 20). AIPAC advocates for “security assistance to Israel and
the development of cooperative missile defense programs with the United States, which
allow Israel to defend herself by herself” (AIPAC 2020). When promoting the U.S.-Israel
relationship, AIPAC conceives and presents this security relationship as a benefit to both
parties: Israel and the United States of America (AIPAC 2020). The organization is a
registered domestic lobby group that is supported by private contributions. Among the
actions in AIPAC’s broader strategy are “initiating email campaigns, offering trips to
Israel for politicians and community leaders, developing constituency groups that will
contact their Senators and Congressmen, and providing educational programs” (Yoffee
2014, paragraph 3).
AIPAC’s activists point to the work they put into building relationships as
responsible for their success (Stolberg 2019, paragraph 19). According to the Center for
Responsive Politics, in 2018 AIPAC spent 3.5 million dollars on lobbying. Among older
American Jews, donating to AIPAC is primarily a practice. As Beinart described, “the
average large donor to a major American Jewish organization is in his fifties, sixties, or
seventies” (Beinart 2012, 31). Although AIPAC does not donate to political campaigns,
many of the organization’s financial supporters are also actively engaged in supporting
candidates that support with their pro-Israel ideals (Stolberg 2019).
AIPAC exists within two broader and overlapping structures: the ‘Israel Lobby’
and the American Jewish establishment (represented in the table). While these groups
may overlap, there are distinct and important differences between the two that must be
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recognized. The bounds and particular beliefs of the ‘Israel Lobby’ are debated and does
include some diversity; this group broadly includes interest groups that support the
political, military, and cultural relationship between the United and Israel. Some of the
most powerful and prominent organizations within the Israel Lobby are AIPAC, the AntiDefamation League, the Conference of Presidents [of Major American Jewish
Organizations], the Zionist Organization of America, and Christians United for Israel”
(Mearsheimer 2017, paragraph 26). One important distinction between the ‘Israel Lobby’
and the American Jewish establishment is that the Israel Lobby also includes
organizations that are not Jewish, like Christians United for Israel. AIPAC is also a
widely discussed example of the Israel since is it is the “most powerful” and “best
known” group about the “Israel Lobby” (Mearsheimer 2017, paragraph 26).
One of the most important pieces of literature on the “Israel Lobby” and
specifically AIPAC is John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s 2016 book The Israel
Lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt argue that “the United States has a special relationship
with Israel that has no parallel in modern history and it is almost wholly due to the lobby”
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) (Mearsheimer 2017, under “John Mearsheimer”). The
uniqueness of this relationship stems from unconditional support of the United States
delivered through aid (Mearsheimer 2017, under “John Mearsheimer”). AIPAC and other
organizations are criticized by opponents who argue that the Lobby controls U.S. foreign
policy. Mearsheimer and Walt debate these misconceptions by illustrating that the Lobby
functions “pretty much the same” as other powerful interest groups, like the National
Rifle Association, the farm lobby, and many others.
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Organizations within the Jewish establishment hold inherent differences from the
Israel Lobby. Although they may espouse similar pro-Israel viewpoints to the Israel
Lobby, many organizations’ fundamental purposes are not to promote the U.S.-Israel
relationship, but rather to create a space for Jewish religious and cultural experiences.
Organizations like AIPAC and the CoP exist at the intersection of both spaces, both
within the broader structure of the American Jewish establishment and the American
Israel Lobby. Moreover, although AIPAC is not Jewish, and therefore should not be
understood as representing the views of the greater American Jewish population, Jews
make up AIPAC’s “vital core” (Bruck 2014, paragraph 10).
AIPAC today commands a large amount of power in Washington and is also
highly organized across the United States. With 100,000 members, 17 regional offices,
and "a vast pool of donors," AIPAC is a powerful actor that shapes American foreign
policy on Israel (Bruck 2014, paragraph 10). The power of AIPAC (and other
organizations within the Israel Lobby) has been widely discussed and is considered
highly controversial. Nonetheless, AIPAC itself recognizes the power that it holds in
Washington to shape U.S. policy on Israel. Connie Bruck, in her 2014 New Yorker
article, asserts that AIPAC’s promotional literature describes how a reception during its
annual policy conference “will be attended by more members of Congress than almost
any other event, except for a joint session of Congress or a State of the Union address”
(Bruck 2014, paragraph 2). However, AIPAC has not always been this powerful.
Before the Six-day War AIPAC was still a rather small and unknown organization
in Washington, DC. The Six-Day War and Israel’s subsequent victory was one of the
most important moments in AIPAC’s history, for it emboldened the relationship between
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American Jews and Israel as well as solidified the key political and cultural role that
AIPAC played within this relationship. American Jewish support for Israel, through
lobbying the U.S. Congress to provide Israel with military support, fostered a sense
among American Jews that they were a part of Israel’s military victories. As Michael
Barnett describes, American Jews garnered support in their unique ways, “Israel had F15s, America had the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and it was
because of AIPAC that Israel had the F-15s. Israel and American Jews made a great
team. At times, American Jews seemed to mistake Israel’s military feats for their own”
(Barnett 2016, 163). As Israel grew central to the American Jewish identity, the cultural
significance of AIPAC among American Jews also grew simultaneously. No longer just a
Washington, DC lobby group, AIPAC became the “bellwether” of one’s Jewish identity
(Barnett 2016, 164). For example, AIPAC’s annual Washington, DC Policy Conference
became “something akin to High Holiday services for the Jewish political elite” (Barnett
2016, 164).
AIPAC’s narrative of ubiquitous support for Israel emphasizes a tribalistic
understanding of the Jewish identity. As introduced in chapter 1, there are two different
and opposing notions of Jewish identity—particularism/tribalism and
universalism/cosmopolitanism, as described by Michael Barnett in The Star and the
Stripes. The term particularism describes and defines “how Jews see themselves in
relation to Gentiles, their obligations to those inside and outside the Jewish community,
and their sense of the purpose of the world” (Barnett 2016, 7). Particularism emphasizes
the notion of Jewish purpose and place in the world as Am Segulah, or “chosen people”
(Barnett 2016, 7) Particularism is central to the AIPAC and American Jewish
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establishment’s construction of Jewish identity, for they see the Jewish people as
distinctly and uniquely situated in the world, both in terms of their historical experiences
and connection to Israel.
AIPAC connects the existence of Israel (and its personal role in promoting and
preserving Israel’s security) to a broader narrative of Jewish peoplehood and their
experiences as the eternal victim. AIPAC’s role in creating, maintaining, and promoting
the United States’ political and military support for Israel has in turn led the organization
to elevate the perception of their importance to the survival of the Jewish people. As
Connie Bruck describes this phenomenon:
AIPAC created an interesting mantra that they honestly believed: that, if AIPAC
had existed prior to the Second World War, America would have stopped Hitler.
It’s a great motivator, and a great fund-raiser—but I think it’s also AIPAC’s
greatest weakness. Because if you convince yourself that, if only you had been
around, six million Jews would not have been killed, then you sort of lose sight of
the fact that the U.S. has its own foreign policy, and, while it is extremely friendly
to Israel, it will only go so far (Bruck 2014).
This narrative of victimhood is presented by the broader camp of the American
Jewish establishment. This camp draws a connection between the biblical traumas, such
as escaping oppression in Ancient Egypt, to those more recent, such as the Holocaust. For
American Jews in this group, they connect the very founding and survival of Israel with
freedom from ever again having to experience existential threats to their existence.
Before the founding of the modern state of Israel, modern Jewish identity was predicated
on the idea of exile within the diaspora. The re-establishment of a modern state of Israel
in Jews biblical home therefore transformed the Jewish narrative from one of exile into
one of redemption. The historical understanding of Jewish identity grounded in
victimhood shapes how the pro-Israel camp sees physical and political attacks on Israel
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today. Whether it is violent uprisings against the Israeli military or a peaceful protest
from the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, the pro-Israel camp connects
these incidents to the long history of anti-Semitism and Jewish victimhood. Pro-Israel
groups will thus delegitimize beliefs that run counter to a particularistic narrative of
Judaism, connecting the historical and biblical connections to Israel and the unique
experiences of victimhood with the importance of Israel today.

J Street and Liberal Zionism
The “Liberal Zionist” group spans the two visions of modern Judaism-Universalism and Particularism—pushing the group to embrace not only the ancient
Jewish unique connection to the land of Israel, but also the cosmopolitan values of social
justice and care for all human beings. As a result of these competing values,
organizations within the “Liberal Zionist camp” uphold a vision of Israel that is driven by
both liberal, democratic values and a recognition of the place as the eternal Jewish
national homeland. These two visions lead the center-left camp to publicly question both
the Israeli and Palestinian’s governments actions that defy peace and a future two-state
solution, while simultaneously affirming and supporting the Israel’s right to exist as
Jewish state.
While the Liberal Zionism group may often have overlapping interests, values, or
beliefs to the two other groups, there are clear red lines that Establishment and AntiOccupation organizations uphold that separate Liberal Zionist organizations from these
two other camps. While in the past Liberal Zionist organizations were regarded as beyond
the pale of acceptance and normalcy for establishment organizations, these red lines have
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begun to evolve, allowing these center-left organizations to slowly grow to become more
normalized and accepted by some mainstream American Jews.
The case study organization that represents the “Liberal Zionist” is J Street, an
organization that was founded in 2007 to “serve as the political home and voice for proIsrael, pro-peace Americans” (J Street 2020). The founder and president of J Street
Jeremy Ben Ami describes how he created J Street to provide a “moderate voice”—a
voice that he believes has been “drowned out” by “the loudest eight percent” of American
Jews who are the most vocal, single-minded, right-wing, and uncritical in their support
for Israel (Jeremy Ben-Ami, A New Voice for Israel, 94–95). He believed that the
viewpoint his organization presents—of supporting Israel while allowing for criticism of
it—would better represent the majority of Jewish Americans. This viewpoint greatly
differs from the policies of establishment organizations like AIPAC who yield
unwavering support for Israel irrespective of the extent to which the nation takes actions
following democratic values, particularly in its treatment of the Palestinian people. BenAmi saw the vast amount of power that AIPAC wielded in Washington, DC among
political actors, and therefore he envisioned creating an organization that would “give
cover to Democrats to get tough on Israel and pressure them to make a deal with
Palestinians” (Saleh and Grim 2019, paragraph 5).
J Street is part of a group of other left-leaning organizations engaged in promoting
a two-state solution. On June 24, 2019, ten leading organizations—Ameinu, Americans
for Peace Now, Hashomer Hatzair, The Jewish Labor Committee, J Street, The New
Israel Fund, Partners for Progressive Israel, Reconstructing Judaism, and T’ruah—united
to create the Progressive Israel Network Organizations. As Reconstructing Judaism
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describes, the network will “provide a strong, unified voice in support of its members’
common goals: democracy and equal rights, religious freedom and pluralism, and a twostate solution that would secure a peaceful future for Israel and end the 52-year-long
occupation” (Reconstructing Judaism 2019, paragraph 4). These organizations seek better
representation and recognition among mainstream American Jewish institutions. The
Progressive Israel Network will, for example, run for a joint list in the World Zionist
Congress to ensure that institutions will “reflect our values” (Reconstructing Judaism
2019, paragraph 3).
While J Street was not the first organization to seek to change the status quo to
embrace both liberal and pro-Israel values, seeking to shape the narrative around Israel
within American politics and across American Jewish political life, the organization has
been by far one of the most successful among other like-minded organizations. J Street’s
founder describes how he views it as a victory that there is now a growing awareness of
the diversity of opinions among American Jews:
Five years ago [before J Street was founded] there was no sense in this town that
there were two points of view in the Jewish community. Today I would say that
eighty percent of people in this town are aware that there is a division in the
Jewish community on this issue [the Israeli-Palestinian conflict]. Just awareness
of the existence of diversity of debate is a huge victory (quoted in Waxman 2016,
179).
J Street’s actions that seek to change the narrative around Israel is not about telling
people exactly what to believe, but rather is about “trying to redefine what it means to be
pro-Israel. You don’t have to be noncritical. You don’t have to adopt the party line. It’s
not, ‘Israel, right or wrong’” (Traub 2009, paragraph 2).
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The organization has grown successfully since its founding in 2007. During J
Street’s first few years, it went from “being a small start-up (with only four full-time staff
members) to becoming a major player in the pro-Israel lobby (with a staff of fifty). J
Street’s operating budget increased from roughly $1.5 million in 2008 to almost $7
million in 2013” (quoted in Waxman 2016, 164). As of 2019, J Street has a $10 million
annual budget (Saleh and Grim 2019, section “equal opportunity boss”). The organization
today also commands a large membership of “well over 100,000 supporters” (Waxman
2016, 164). J Street has also showed increasing growth at its annual national conferences;
“1,500 people attended its first conference in October 2009, which featured a keynote
speech by then U.S. national security adviser James L. Jones. By the time of its fourth
conference, in 2013, there were more than 2,800 attendees, and speeches by U.S. Vice
President Joe Biden, U.S. Middle East envoy Martin Indyk, and Israel’s then minister of
justice and lead peace negotiator Tzipi Livni” (Waxman 2016, 165).
The growth of J Street, in drawing attention to the diversity of beliefs on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict among American Jews, has also illustrated that groups like
AIPAC do not speak for all Jewish Americans. The name of the group fits in with this
vision of fulfilling a role that didn’t previously exist. As the 2019 article in “The
Intercept” describes, the group chose to name itself “J Street” as because “there is no J
Street in the city, and this new group aimed to be something new under the Washington
sun” (Saleh and Grim 2019, paragraph 7). The founder of the organization has played
such a central role since the beginning that the “joke inside J Street is that the “J” now
stands for “Jeremy” (Saleh and Grim 2019, paragraph 7).
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While J-street’s target audience are “pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans who want
Israel to be secure, democratic and the national home of the Jewish people,” they work
actively with and for American Jewish communities whose voices were previously
“underrepresented and ignored in our politics” (J Street 2019, under “What we do”). In J
Street’s paperwork when they filed for non-profit status, the organization best described
mobilization and action strategy: “by educating, organizing and mobilizing the large
segment (81 percent) of American Jews who support strong U.S. leadership for a twostate solution, we can provide the space and support the president and policy makers need
to boldly help Israelis and Palestinians resolve their conflict” (GuideStar 2006, under
“Charting Impact”).
J Street has embraced an organizing strategy that advocates and engages
individuals on every level—"in Washington, in political campaigns, in our communities
and on campuses” (J Street 2020, under “What we do”). Through J Street U, the student
organizing arm of J Street, the organization engages students, trains campus leadership,
and fosters a community of young people interested in changing campus dialogue around
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (J Street U 2020). Meanwhile, JStreetPAC was established
in 2008 as the “first-ever federal political action committee (PAC) to explicitly
promote American leadership to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (J Street Pac
2020). The PAC has the goal of demonstrating that there is a “depth and breadth of
political support” for candidates that favor a “diplomacy-first approach to advancing US
interests in the Middle East and promoting peace and security for Israel” (J Street Pac
2020). J Street’s campus organizing arm and affiliated PAC allow it to attack its mission
of changing the national conversation and create the political space for pro-Israel and
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pro-Peace policies. Whereas the former provides it the tools to promote activism and
organizing among young people on this issue, the latter seeks to ensure that the people
who will support their goals are granted a position of power.
The growth of J Street has called into question the power of AIPAC. J street has
only a “tiny fraction of AIPAC’s financial power and influence on Capitol Hill,” yet as
Connie Bruck describes J Street has tried to “provide at least some campaign funding to
weaken the lobby’s grip” (Bruck 2014, paragraph 55). Despite J Street being founded to
provide an alternative to AIPAC and its success in challenging the prior status quo, the
organization denies that it has any intention to compete with AIPAC. In one interview for
example, Ben-Ami describes that “we [ J Street] are not, in any way, in opposition to
AIPAC. In fact, we want to work with them on much of what they do” (quoted in
Waxman 2016, 267). However, Waxman denotes a contradictory statement by Ben-Ami
during an author interview in 2011 saying that “just getting members of Congress to say
no when AIPAC calls is the first step” (quoted in Waxman 2016, 267). Waxman also
describes the implications of “J Street’s rapid expansion and growing political activism”
as “not only challenged AIPAC, but also undoubtedly contributed—for better or for
worse (depending on your point of view)—to the further splintering of the pro-Israel
lobby” (Waxman 2016, 148). By “splintering of the pro-Israel lobby,” Waxman is
referring to the increasing fragmentation and political division within the Israel Lobby as
a result of being challenged by contradictory viewpoints, particularly from increasingly
powerful American Jewish institutions, like J Street.
The American Jewish establishment has resisted changes to accepted viewpoints
around Israel stemming from Liberal Zionist organizations like J Street. One clear
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occasion of when the establishment upheld very clear red lines was when the Conference
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP) denied J Street membership
to the Conference in 2014. This significant and recent example of denying J Street from
joining a prominent body of powerful American Jewish by a wide margin illustrates the
American Jewish establishment’s continuous resistance to groups that criticize Israel. J
Street responded to its denied entry by arguing that it reaffirms their reasoning for
existing: that the Jewish establishment claims to “speak for the entire Jewish
community,” yet they do not “in fact represent the full diversity of pro-Israel views in
[the Jewish and broader American] community” (Black 2014, paragraph 4).

IfNotNow and Anti-Occupation Activism
The “Anti-Occupation” group is defined by a universalist vision of Judaism that
compels American Jews to stand up against actions that support the Israeli occupation.
This means that these organization disagree with and criticize not only Israel’s actions
that deliberately undermine the freedom and dignity of Palestinians but also the actions of
the American Jewish community, and particularly the Jewish establishment, that support
Israel. The “Anti-Occupation” camp focuses specifically on Israel’s role in perpetuating
the conflict by occupying the Palestinian territories. They support actions that lead to the
“shared humanity and full equality of Palestinians and Israelis alike” (Dashefsky and
Sheskin 2019, 639). The American Jewish Establishment views these “Anti-Occupation”
groups as ‘beyond the pale’ of acceptance and describe such groups as “self-hating
Jews.” Although the “Anti-Occupation” and “Liberal Zionist” groups at times uphold
similar opinions, there are clear red lines between these groups; for example, whereas the
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former upholds either negative or neutral beliefs about Zionism, the latter outwardly
expresses and celebrates Zionism. IfNotNow (INN) is an important example of an antioccupation Jewish group that has gained traction and significant attention since its
founding.
INN was founded during the midst of the 2014 Israel-Gaza war also known as
Operation Protective Edge. Mainstream American Jewish institutions, like AIPAC,
responded to this violence by mourning the lives of Israelis lost or put in danger and
supporting the Israeli government’s aggressive tactics to quell Palestinian violence in
Gaza and the West Bank. Instead, this group of American Jews came together to “honor
the loss of both Israeli and Palestinian life” (IfNotNow 2020, under “How IfNotNow
Began & Our Strategy). Across nearly a dozen cities American Jews joined together in
protest. They said the Mourner’s Kaddish, the Jewish prayer in honor of the deceased, for
both Palestinians and Israeli lives lost. The protestors presented three demands, “Stop the
War on Gaza, End the Occupation, and Freedom and Dignity for All;” these demands
would later inform INN’s mission (IfNotNow 2020, under “How IfNotNow Began & Our
Strategy). The protestors’ recognition of the Palestinian narrative and suffering stands in
stark contrast to Jewish establishment organizations who blame the Palestinians and
interpret these acts of violence within the constructs of terrorism.
Since the start of INN’s movement, the organization has constructed its practices
and values around Jewish ritual, traditions, languages, and practices (IfNotNow 2020,
under “Our Principles”). INN’s protests have continuously incorporated Jewish elements
and have made Jewish songs and teachings central to their protest of American Jewish
support of the Occupation. The group’s name is also founded in Jewish tradition. They
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united around the name, “If Not Now, When?” in 2014 (that would later become
IfNotNow). This phrase originates from a well-known saying by the 1st century Jewish
teacher Hillel the Elder: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And being for
myself, what am 'I'? If not now, when?" (Blumberg 2014, paragraph 3).
INN’s mission spans both American politics in general as well as American
Jewish institutions with the goal of reorienting policies regarding Israel around liberal
values, including justice. As INN’s website describes, “on the one hand, we are part of
the ubiquitous American project, taking action so all can be equal. And on the other, we
embrace our uniquely Jewish identity, as we sit down to shabbat dinner or sit in at ICE
detention centers” (IfNotNow 2020, under “United and clear-eyed, we are the majority
and the future of our community”). Today, the organization is working toward two
interrelated goals: to end Israel’s occupation and to transform the American Jewish
community to represent their values of justice and dignity (IfNotNow 2020, under “Who
We Are”).
After the 2014 war in Gaza ended, the leaders of these protests sought to cultivate
a widespread American Jewish movement centered around ending the occupation of
Palestinians and standing for the freedom and dignity of both Palestinians and Israelis.
They joined the Momentum organizing community, a training institute and movement
incubator that has had participants across many other significant and recent movementbuilding groups, including Black Lives Matter, Dream Defenders, BYP100, United We
Dream, Showing Up For Racial Justice, 350.org, National People’s Action, PICO, and
more” (Momentum Community 2020, under “What does Momentum teach?”). The
organization thus upholds a grassroots structure of organizing and grew alongside a
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cohort of other significant liberal movements, many of which gained momentum in
response to the rise of Donald Trump. INN believes in Momentum’s organizational
strategy that change will happen when there is either 3.5 % active support or 50% passive
support for their cause; INN approximates this to support from 180,000 American Jews
actively or 3 million Jewish passively (IfNotNow 2018).
After joining Momentum organizing community, IfNotNow has grown
exponentially from a small group of American Jews concerned with the “hawkish
response of American Jewish institutions” towards the violence of Operation Protective
Edge into a vibrant grassroots social movement working across sixteen cities in the
United States and Canada (IfNotNow 2020, under “How IfNotNow Began & Our
Strategy”). Between 2016 and 2018, IfNotNow hosted more than 350 protests,
cumulatively engaging 10,000 people (Brinley 2018, paragraph 23). As of 2019, INN had
“trained an estimated 1,675 people, drawn countless more sympathizers and casual
supporters, and become a formidable opponent to the right and center-left” (Reisman
2019, paragraph 10).
INN’s organizing beliefs are based around a social view of power in which people
exist at the top and “have the power” and the power holders exist at the bottom
(IfNotNow 2018). Instead of leaders dictating to individuals the organization’s beliefs,
the people hold their leaders accountable. Through this strategy, INN has focused their
efforts on gaining support from the public—the mainstream American Jewish
community—rather than meeting with existing community leadership (or the boards of
American Jewish Establishment organizations). As INN describes in their training
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materials for new activists, “sustainable change will only happen if we create a cultural
change in our community” and then leadership will follow (IfNotNow 2018).
The organization’s national organizing structure of “Support and Coordination”
aligns with their vision of employing grassroots activism to dismantle existing systems of
power. This system of organizing has likely been an important factor in leading to the
INN’s success in mobilizing young American Jews and quickly growing their
organization. INN’s national organizing structure features regional “Hives” that bring
together activists within local groups. Each Hive has a set of teams, with several teams
focused on particular tasks; for example, each local Hive has an ‘actions team’ and a
‘communications team.’ Within each team, there are two coaches or “spokes” that
“support and participate in local teams, share lessons and coordinate across cities, decide
on national proposals with advice from their local teams, and run regular local team
organization trainings” (INN Training Materials, “National Structure - Support and
Coordination,” 2019). Then, each of these specific regional teams unite form a “Hub”
that brings together other teams fulfilling the same role from other cities, such as
Actions/Communication Hub (INN Training Materials). This organizational structure
inherently creates routes for regional and national cooperation and open lines of
communication, as well as encourages growth of local-level leaders through coaches and
spokes. The grassroots structure has helped the organization gain Jewish members and
leaders from diverse backgrounds, as well as aided and accelerated its growth across
several cities.
INN has made strides in moving forward with their four-phase plan to transform
the American Jewish community. According to their four-phase plan the group must first
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be united, build a foundation, and then show itself as a growing social movement. Next,
the young generation must take action and show that they stand for freedom and dignity
for both Palestinians and Israelis. Third, they must expose the moral crisis through
showing that people across generations concerned and taking action in unprecedented
numbers. Finally, they seek to shift the majority of US Jewish community (INN Training
Materials). INN is currently in the second phase of mobilization—appealing to young
American Jews who are outraged by the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
their own community’s response to this violence. INN’s materials describe their two
target constituencies as millennial liberals and young Jewish leaders involved in Jewish
institutions—or, in simpler terms “engaged Jews looking for a political home & activists
looking for a Jewish home” (INN Training Materials). As a result, their current actions to
mobilize young Jewish Americans and to depict themselves as an important force to be
reckoned with should be understood as part of a broader, consecutive, and ongoing
strategy to transform American Jewish institutions’ policies regarding Israel.
INN exists as part of a group of progressive American Jewish organizations
related to Israel and the conflict that seeks to end the Occupation, promote the dignity and
rights of both Israeli and Palestinians, and conduct social justice work. Among
organizations within this group are Jewish Voices for Peace (JVP), New Israel Fund,
T’ruah. Founded in 1996, JVP has been engaged in this issues much longer than INN and
embraces similar goals through their focus on seeking “an end to the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem; security and self-determination for
Israelis and Palestinians; a just solution for Palestinian refugees based on principles
established in international law; an end to violence against civilians; and peace and
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justice for all peoples of the Middle East” (Jewish Voice for Peace 2020, under
“Mission”). However, these two groups differ in their approach to presenting positions
controversial issues. INN does not take a stand on the Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions “(BDS) movement, political Zionism, or a 1- or 2- state solution to the
conflict” (Wyron 2017, 5). Meanwhile, JVP supports the BDS movements and
“unequivocally oppose[s] Zionism” (Jewish Voice for Peace 2020, under “Our Approach
to Zionism”). INN’s choice not to take a stand on these issues make it unique from other
American Jewish leftist organizations working on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. As
described in a 2019 New York Magazine profile, INN’s refusal to answer certain
questions regarding issues is a helpful strategy by “uniting people” with a broader set of
beliefs, joining together those who are Zionist and anti-Zionist, as well as supporters and
opponents of BDS (Reisman 2019, paragraph 12). Nonetheless, the lack of clear
viewpoints on controversial issues has incited criticism from opponents who say that “it
hasn’t articulated and agreed upon what it’s for so much as what it’s against” (Reisman
2019, paragraph 34).
Besides “Anti-Occupation” organizations, INN also exists within a broader
network of American Jewish organizations working to secure and promote progressive
causes in the United States, such as Bend the Arc and Jews for Racial & Economic
Justice. This group of organizations are not specifically focused on the Israeli Palestinian
conflict, but rather are oriented around social justice. They draw upon Jewish values like
tikkun olam to motivate their activism for liberal causes.
INN’s relationship to liberal “Liberal Zionist” or “Establishment” organizations is
shaped by the fact that many of its activists were previously affiliated members or leaders
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within these other organizations. For example, IfNotNow co-founder Simone
Zimmerman was previously the national president of J Street U, the campus arm of J
Street. She ultimately felt that J Street was not “radical enough” for her beliefs, especially
after J Street expressed unanimous support for Israel during the 2014 war (Reisman 2019,
Section 2). J Street does not necessarily see the growth of organizations to its left as
negative, and Ben-Ami even told the writers of a New York Magazine article “The
Jewish Revolt” that he finds IfNotNow “really exciting” (Reisman 2019, paragraph 11).
Zimmerman’s story is not unique, and many of IfNotNow’s members were
previously affiliated in the American Jewish Establishment or other Liberal
organizations. As the New York Post profile of INN describes, “Zimmerman’s story is
echoed in those of so many IfNotNow members. Time and again, I spoke to Jewish 20and (to a lesser extent) 30-somethings who were raised in the Reform or Conservative
denominations and remain as passionate about the Jewish community and Jewish practice
as they are newly critical of its institutions” (Reisman 2019, Section 2). These prior
personal relationships among members, particularly with “Establishment” organizations,
have shaped INN’s mission to “transform the American Jewish community” to reflect
their Jewish values (IfNotNow 2019, under “Who We Are”). INN’s #YouNeverToldMe
campaign depicts this complicated relationship with Jewish Establishment organizations,
calling upon “Jewish summer camp, day school, and youth group alumni who grew up in
institutions that ignored or justified the Occupation” to share their experiences and ask
their “institutions to provide Jewish education that advances freedom and dignity for all
people” (You Never Told Me 2020).
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Conclusion
This chapter provides a framework to understand the three primary groups of
American Jewish organizations engaged in Israel- and Conflict-related work. These three
groups—the “Establishment,” “Liberal Zionist,” and “Occupation” groups—exist on a
spectrum, and the “Liberal Zionist” category shares some similarities with both groups.
However, some fundamental differences separate these camps of organizations, often
leading to conflict
The founding, growth, and increasing normalization of organizations in the
“Liberal Zionist” and “Anti-Occupation” camps questions the power of the establishment
to shape the narrative over Jewish support for Israel both internally and outside of the
Jewish community. The traditionalist and transformationalist differences apply to the
American Jewish divide over Israel, impacting how one perceives changes to Jewish
attachments to Israel. Traditionalists look negatively upon changes to the status quo
around Jewish attachment to Israel, such as the growth of “Liberal Zionist” and “AntiOccupation” groups, and seek to preserve consensus support for Israel;
Transformationalists would instead view these changes in a more hopeful light as an
opportunity to develop new forms of Jewishness and Jewish practice in the modern
world.
The next chapter discusses how changes in American politics since 2016 have
impacted the three camps of American Jewish Israel-related organizations in a variety of
ways. I depict the role of changes that American politics played in effecting American
Jewish life through exploring its unique impact on each of my three case study
organizations.
71

4
Post-2016 American Jewish Politics
Introduction
My thesis seeks to understand to what extent fundamental changes in American
politics have affected American Jewish interest groups and public opinions. To measure
these effects, I have chosen to look particularly at American Jewish organizations that are
Israel-related. The changes within these interest groups are at the epicenter of broader
changes to American Jewish political life and help to illuminate the growing changes in
political sentiment and mobilization among American Jews today. These changes should
not be understood as the sole result of changes in American politics. Rather, American
political rifts and movements since 2016 have furthered previously existing internal
trends in American Jewish life, such as growing rates of intermarriage, different
generational experiences, and the diverging politics of Israel and American Jews as
discussed in chapter 2. The development of these trends has led to an increase in internal
polarization and political mobilization.
This chapter will explore how phenomena resulting from the 2016 election—the
rise of Trump, challenges to bipartisanship, and growing rifts within the Democratic
Party between leftist and progressive factions—have directly impacted American Jewish
interest group representation and mobilization on the issue of Israel, particularly as it
relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After describing these phenomena and their
relation to politics in Israel and the U.S.-Israeli relationship, I analyze their connection to
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recent internal changes within my three case study organizations. Through examining
AIPAC, IfNotNow, and J Street’s internal challenges or mobilization since 2016, I
illustrate how changes within American Jewish Israel-politics were advanced through
fundamental changes in American politics.

The Rise of Trump, Political Polarization, and Democratic Party Rifts
The 2016 election sparked substantial changes within American politics and
political culture. Although political polarization and the growth of progressive
movements in America had already begun during the prior years of President Obama, this
election was monumental and furthered existing political divisions across America. The
following sections explore how the rise of Donald Trump during the 2016 election, with
his untraditional rhetoric, values, and presidency, advanced the already existing
polarization between Republicans and Democrats. Trump’s discussion and
implementation of policies that undermined minority rights stimulated progressive groups
to take immediate action and rally for the rights of women, undocumented immigrants,
women, and LGBTQ people among others; progressive mobilization into counter protests
contributed to the growth of the progressive wing of the Democratic party in the years
following Trump’s election. These trends in American political culture directly impacted
individuals and political actors across America. American Jewish politics is just one
example of many groups that was affected.
Before the 2016 election, pertinent political divides existed in Jewish America—
divides that ebbed and flowed depending upon the political circumstances of the time in
the United States and Israel. Nonetheless, the rise of President Donald Trump in 2016
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catalyzed fundamental changes in American politics that protruded American Jewish life.
For Democrats, the 2016 election cultivated significant political mobilization on social
justice issues. American Jews similarly became swept up in these social justice
movements. They joined causes relevant to their Jewishness—including promoting
Israeli-Palestinian peace and fighting the recent upsurge in anti-Semitism and white
nationalism—along with many secular causes, such as protecting undocumented
immigrants and protesting for women’s rights. As a result, the larger transformations
within American political life shaped and informed the causes and the representation of
viewpoints across American Jewish interest groups, leading to mobilization and
polarization.
Political Polarization
Political polarization, or the vast and growing gap between Republicans and
Democrats, has become a “defining feature of American politics today” (Pew Research
Center, “Political Polarization”). As liberals’ and conservatives’ viewpoints move further
apart on the political spectrum, Americans’ willingness to listen to disagreeing
viewpoints have diminished. Americans that hold views from opposing ends of the
political spectrum also exist in separate political ‘bubbles,’ reading dissimilar new
sources, socializing with groups of like-minded individuals, and following accounts on
social media that espouse similar views. This has led to the erosion of interactions
between individuals with viewpoints from different ends of the political spectrum,
impacting how American political organizations operate and decreasing everyday
Americans’ willingness to cooperate, as well as political actors’ bipartisanship, such as in
Congress.
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While Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election was in many ways a product
of the already existing polarization in the United States, his presidency has continuously
played into, and increased, partisan divides. One illustration of the growing polarization
was Trump’s approval ratings from his third year in office; “eighty-two percentage points
separated Republicans’ (89%) and Democrats’ (7%) average job approval ratings” (Jones
2020, paragraph 1). As Jeffrey Jones describes in Gallup, this is the “largest degree of
political polarization in any presidential year measured by Gallup, surpassing the 79point party gap in Trump's second year in office” (Jones 2020, paragraph 1).
The issue of Israel has also not remained separate from the growing partisanship
in the United States. As Martin Indyk, a former ambassador to Israel under President Bill
Clinton, described “this split between Republicans and Democrats on Israel is real and is
mirrored in a split between the government of Israel and the American Jewish
community” (Stolberg 2019). According to a 2018 poll by Pew Research Center, the
partisan divide over American support for Israel was at its “widest in four decades, with
79 percent of Republicans sympathizing with Israel in its dispute with the Palestinians,
versus 27 percent of Democrats” (quoted in Stolberg 2019) (Pew Research Center 2018).
Although 70% of American Jews identify as Democrats, American Jewish Republicans
are much more likely to see caring about Israel as an essential part of being Jewish (Pew
Research Center 2013). The rise of Trump has furthered these existing challenges to
bipartisanship, putting American Jewish organizations and individuals who support Israel
in a difficult place. Rabbi Shmuel Herzfeld, who leads Ohev Sholom, an Orthodox
congregation in Washington, D.C., describes how Trump’s alignment with Israel is in
some ways “very dangerous” (Lerer and Diaz 2019, paragraph 7). Rabbi Herzfeld said
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that “if Israel equals Trump, then there is a concern that opposition to Trump will
transition, God forbid, into opposition to Israel” (Lerer and Diaz 2019, paragraph 7).
Israel’s internal politics is similarly divided between two polls with increasingly
right-wing leadership, as represented by current Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s
right-wing Likud Party and Benny Gantz’ central and liberal political alliance Blue and
White. Under the leadership of Netanyahu, Israel has moved further to the right and has
undertaken blatantly discriminatory policies against Palestinians as well as the nonJewish Arab citizens. The 2018 nation-state law in particular illustrates this right-ward
movement by “legally enshrining Israel’s Jewish character” at the expense of minority
groups living in the nation (Badie 2019).
As Israel moves further to the right, the “Netanyahu-Republican Alliance has only
strengthened” (Stolberg 2019). The growing alliance between Trump and Netanyahu
serves to benefit both leaders in their re-election campaigns. Martin S. Indyk described
that “you have a situation where Netanyahu is relying on Trump to help him in his reelection, and Trump is expecting Netanyahu to reciprocate” (Stolberg 2019). The
relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu “could not be
better,” for Trump has served as a reliable ally for Netanyahu’s most controversial
policies, such as recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a disputed
territory (Badie 2019). Netanyahu has reciprocated appreciation for Trump by, for
example, naming a new town after Trump in June 2019 (Stolberg 2019).
The polarizing and controversial nature of Trump’s presidency throughout the
United States, and Trump’s explicit alignment with right wing forces within Israel, has
created unique challenges for American Jews. The sections following depict how
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Trump’s election and support for Israel has contributed to polarization and challenges to
bipartisanship for American Jews on the issue of Israel.
Democratic Party Rifts
A big split has also emerged within the Democratic party that is characterized by
an ideological divide between progressive and moderate camps. The differences between
these two factions grew especially apparent during the 2020 Democratic Party debates.
Progressive candidates like Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Elizabeth Warren stood
in stark contrast to moderate Democratic candidates like Vice President Joe Biden and
Mayor Pete Buttigieg. These groups represent separate ideological factions within the
Democratic party. The trend of support for these different candidates and visions of the
Democratic party is also generational skewed with younger democrats embracing a more
progressive vision of party politics.
This progressive-left divide has had noticeable effects on American Jews today,
the vast majority of whom lean Democrat. Alisson Summers describes in Haaretz how
focusing only on the left-right polarization narrative “distracts from a second and more
complicated divide: A growing political and generational split within the Democratic
liberal American-Jewish majority” (Summers 2019). As identified in Chapter 2,
generational divides have not only pervaded the Democratic party, but also American
Jewish life. Older and younger generations of Jewish Americans have had fundamentally
different Jewish and Israel experiences that have led younger generations to orient their
values around social justice and progressive causes, while older generations instead
remain more attached to particularistic values that lead them to unequivocally support
Israel. Aaron David Miller, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International
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Peace and expert on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, connects the “deepening generational
divide in the Democratic Party” to generational differences among American Jews
(Stolberg 2019). For example, whereas young, progressive Jews protested outside of
AIPAC’s policy conference, “older Democrats like Ms. Pelosi and Representative Steny
H. Hoyer, the majority leader, address[ed] delegates inside” (Stolberg 2019).
Since the 2016 election, the discourse within the Democratic Party on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict has changed. Phyllis Bennis’ article “The 2016 U.S. Presidential
Campaign: Changing Discourse on Palestine” argues that although “both major political
parties and both likely candidates ended up situated within or just to the right of the
standard U.S. pro-Israel policy positions,” discourse regarding Israel-Palestine was “on
the Democratic table for the first time in decades, to be debated and discussed as a
legitimate campaign issue” (Bennis 2016, 35). Bernie Sanders rise in the Democratic
Primaries, and his willingness to openly critique Israeli policy, therefore challenging
existing taboos that prevented speaking out against pro-Israel policies and the Israel
Lobby, was certainly important (Bennis 2016, 35). However, one new aspect of this
election was the existence of “some actual discussion and real disagreements among
politicians” on important U.S.-Israel policy issues, such as the legality of settlements, the
amount of U.S. military aid to Israel, and Israel’s use of force during the 2014 war
between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (Bennis 2016, 38). Bennis’ article shows that although
the party leaders—Clinton and Trump—remained committed to traditional standpoints on
Israel, this election represented a turning point in how the Democratic party approached
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict through eroding the existence or appearance of unanimity
over support for Israel, especially among progressive politicians. Since the 2016 election,
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this trend of increasing criticism of Israel among Democratic party leaders and
politicians, and particularly those who subscribe to progressive ideals has continued,
creating a splintering among progressive and leftist leaders.

Case Study Analysis
The First Encounter
When Trump first joined the stage at AIPAC’s annual policy conference (PC) in
Washington, DC in 2016, many were unsure of what sort of welcome the controversial
candidate would receive. A highly important event for those tuned into Israel politics, the
conference typically features keynote speeches by American political leaders from across
the political spectrum, along with Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, with the goal of educating and inspiring participants, garnering donations,
and promoting the U.S.-Israel partnership. With over 18,000 attendees, this annual event
serves as the largest gathering of America’s pro-Israel community, among which are
thousands of American Jewish adults. The annual conference has invited and hosted both
Democratic and Republican presidential primary candidates across several election. That
year, 2016, AIPAC invited all of the major parties’ presidential candidates to speak to
their delegation.
AIPAC’s announcement that, then presidential candidate, Donald Trump would
join to address AIPAC’s Policy Conference spurred widespread conversation among
event attendees regarding how his presence would and ought to be received. Some
members struggled to reconcile Trump’s claims that there is "no one more pro-Israel"
than himself, with the other and more concerning parts of his record, including that he
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initially failed to disavow the support of former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard David Duke
(Golshan 2016, paragraph 8). Despite AIPAC’s practice of allowing each dignified
person, regardless of their political party or politics, to speak and to greet them earnestly,
some of AIPAC’s left-leaning attendees considered breaking this traditional procedure of
decorum. In the days leading up to the conference, a group of Rabbis planned to walk out
during Trump’s remarks. Rabbi David Paskin, one of the organizers of the walkout,
shared that the walkout was “about denouncing hatred in all forms;” it was a reaction to
“Trump calling Mexican immigrants’ rapists, most Muslims terrorists, and American
Jews money-hungry negotiators” (Golshan 2016, paragraph 5).
During the conference, many questioned whether a larger group of people would
join the walk-out during Trump’s speech; in other words, would there be a noticeable
shift in attitude and enthusiasm among attendees when Trump walked on stage? While
there were certainly individuals who were excited about Trump’s invitation to speak at
AIPAC and happily welcomed him to the conference stage, there were also certainly
others who either silently or loudly bemoaned his presence at the conference. During the
speech however the crowd largely remained attentive, silent, and enthusiastic, except for
one Orthodox rabbi who was carried off by security moments after he stood up to protest
Trump (“Rabbi protests Trump's AIPAC speech” 2016).
At the same time as thousands of American Jews gathered inside of the 2016
AIPAC Policy Conference to welcome then candidate Trump, a very different movement
of young Jewish Americans gathered outside of the convention center in protest of
AIPAC and its decision to host Donald Trump. Unlike the group of Rabbis who
unobtrusively protested the event and attended the rest of the conference, supporting
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AIPAC and its pro-Israel mission, the majority of this group of Jewish protesters united
to stand against both AIPAC and Trump. Comprising approximately 200 people, this
protest was organized by IfNotNow (INN). Protests outside of AIPAC’s events by
American Jews, along with other interest groups such as those that are pro-Palestinian,
are not an irregular occurrence. However, the 2016 protests outside of AIPAC’s Policy
Conference, and small groups from within, are significant, for they demonstrate the
beginning of larger shifts taking place within American Jewish interest groups, stemming
from American political changes.
By 2017, the number of American Jews who mobilized outside of AIPAC’s
annual Policy Conference grew by 500%, as compared to the year prior. With more than
1000 protestors, this was the largest, mostly Jewish, anti-AIPAC protest in the
organization’s 54-year history (Bellware 2017). Although American Jews have long
protested and questioned the policies of established Jewish organizations, this particular
protest should be regarded as significant both due its magnitude, along with the
implications it relayed regarding a newly fissuring American Jewish divide. During the
protest, activists sought to attract the attention of conference attendees. For example, four
INN activists purchased tickets to the event, came inside, and dropped banners from the
convention center’s third floor asserting, “reject AIPAC and the occupation” before
security guards quickly removed them from the venue (Gutman 2017).
These distinct groups of American Jews—gathering either inside AIPAC or
outside the conference hall—depict the multitude of American Jewish responses to the
rise of Trump. Whereas the vast majority of the group inside prioritized their support for
Israel, the group protesting outside the conference united in protest of the American
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Jewish establishment’s unequivocal support for Israel and embrace of Donald Trump.
This example exemplifies the opposing visions of Judaism adopted by the groups
gathered inside and outside of the conference; while particularism compelled conference
attendees to continuously support Israel despite the costs, protesters were drawn by a
value of social justice inherent to universalism.
J Street and AIPAC Conventions
Since the 2016 election, the increase of attendance, or lack thereof, of prominent
Democratic politicians at both AIPAC and J Street’s annual national conferences, as well
as INN’s effective rallying calls to #SkipAIPAC, helps to indicate the extent to which the
changing American political culture as well as political organizing by American Jewish
groups have impacted American Jewish interest groups. In particular, factions within the
Democratic party have affected AIPAC’s historically friendly relationship to presidential
candidates and have made J Street’s policies more palatable to mainstream Democratic
politicians. As compared to 2016 when all remaining Republican and Democratic
primary candidates (besides Bernie Sanders) spoke at AIPAC, in 2019 and 2020, many
major Democratic party candidates chose not to attend AIPAC’s Policy Conference. In
2019, many of the major Democratic party candidates including Senator Bernie Sanders,
Senator Elizabeth Warren, Senator Kamala Harris, and Major Pete Buttigieg skipped the
event (Hagen 2019). At AIPAC 2020, the only candidate to speak in person was Michael
Bloomberg, and Vice President Biden and Senator Klobouchar joined by video (Kelly
2020). Since the AIPAC 2020 Policy Conference overlapped with Super Tuesday it was
difficult to determine the true extent to which evolving views of Israel have influenced
candidates’ choices to speak.
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The lack of candidate attendance may be attributed to the Democratic party’s
evolving views on Israel as a result of growing political activism among (often young)
American Jews. There is a growing partisan divide on Israel among both Democratic
voters and candidates. Sheryl Stolberg in her article “Trump and Netanyahu Put
Bipartisan Support for Israel at Risk,” that this divide is “evident on the presidential
campaign trail, where Democrats once vied to see who could be the most supportive of
Israel. Now, some are vying to see who can be the most critical.” (Stolberg 2019). Young
liberal voters have pressured Democratic candidates to make the unprecedented choice to
skip AIPAC’s annual Policy Conference. IfNotNow and two other progressive groups
that don’t focus primarily on Israel, MoveOn and the Working Families Party, have led
the #SkipAIPAC campaign (IfNotNow 2020). The campaign has pushed candidates to
publicly commit to “not join AIPAC’s stage, send in a video message, or attend any
official or unofficial event affiliated with AIPAC’s 2020 Conference (IfNotNow 2020).
As a result of this campaign, two top contenders — Senators Elizabeth Warren and
Bernie Sanders—agreed to boycott the conference. This move is significant, for it is the
“first time top contenders...have boycotted the massive American Israel Public Affairs
Committee policy conference, a signature event on the American Jewish calendar”
(Boorstein 2020, paragraph 2).
Meanwhile, back in October 2019 several prominent Democratic presidential
hopefuls spoke at J Street’s 2019 national convention, which may illustrate the role that
progressive Jewish Americans have played in shifting Democratic party leaders’ views
on Israel. J Street hosted five Democratic party candidates, including mainstream
Democrats Mayor Pete Buttigiege and progressive leaders Senators Warren and Sanders.
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While speaking, the candidates were not afraid to criticize Israel. For example, several
candidates said they were “open to withholding aid from Israel if it annexed more land in
the West Bank” (Medina 2019). In Jennifer Medina’s New York Times article, “2020
Democrats at J Street Conference Reflect New Tone on U.S.-Israel Relations,” she argues
that the candidates’ willingness to speak openly about how they would address the Israeli
occupation of Palestinian territory demonstrates that “Democratic attitudes toward Israel
are shifting in the highest echelons of the party” (Medina 2019). The democratic
candidates’ attendance at J Street in larger numbers may also illustrate how the
organization has benefited from the political polarization that challenge’s AIPAC’s
ability to maintain bipartisanship over pro-Israel politics. These politicians might be
understood as moving over from AIPAC to J Street because the organization’s vision and
values are more palatable to mainstream democrats, allowing them to appeal to a broader
spectrum of voters within the party.
AIPAC’s Challenges
AIPAC has faced challenges since Trump’s election as a result of the President’s
strategy “aimed at dividing the Democratic Party and pushing some Jewish voters into
the arms of Republicans” through “paint[ing] Republicans as Israel’s only true friend in
Washington” (Stolberg 2019). One example of this strategy was when Trump pushed
“Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel into barring an official visit by the first
two Muslim women in Congress” (Stolberg 2019). As Trump aims to gain the support of
Jewish voters, especially single-issue voters seeking to elect candidates who support
Israel, AIPAC has sought to retain bipartisanship despite challenges. As such, AIPAC
split with Trump and Netanyahu on its decision to bar the congresswomen from entering
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Israel, sharing in a statement that they believe “every member of Congress should be able
to visit and experience our democratic ally Israel firsthand" (Jerusalem Post 2019). Many
pro-Israel supporters from across the political spectrum also worry that “the president
could further erode bipartisan support for Israel,” creating long term consequences
including undermining Israel’s security, and furthering the United States’ position in the
Middle East (Stolberg 2019).
At the same time that Trump has sought to divide the Democratic party on Israel,
AIPAC has also embraced and praised the Trump Administration for taking concrete proIsrael actions, such as moving the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, and continue the
decades-long ‘special’ relationship between the United States and Israel. AIPAC would
argue that they have the same support from its members as always and that they have
been incredibly successful in working with the Trump administration to institute proIsrael policies. However, in spite of this support from the current President, AIPAC has
faced challenges since the 2016 elections as a result of two phenomena: political
polarization between Democrats and Republicans, and rifts between leftist and
progressive factions within the Democratic Party. That AIPAC commands a large amount
of power and recognition both within American Jewish life and American Politics means
that the organization has often been subject to criticism. Nonetheless, the particular
nature and fervor of AIPAC’s criticism and challenges by American Jews since 2016 has
been unique and unprecedented in the organization’s decades-long history.
AIPAC’s embrace of both the Trump administration and Israel’s Netanyahu
government calls into question the ability of AIPAC to garner support from both its
Jewish Democratic members as well as politicians. For Democrats who align with
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AIPAC’s pro-Israel beliefs yet disagree with Trump’s illiberal actions, embracing Israel
in an age of unprecedented U.S. polarization will challenge their ability to express
unwavering support. As Mark Mellman, the president of Democratic Majority for Israel,
a nonprofit that works to ensure that the Democratic Party remains pro-Israel, described,
“in our hyperpartisan world, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, and to the extent that
Democrats look at Trump as the enemy, if they see Israel or the Netanyahu
administration as operating hand in glove, that gives them real pause” (Stolberg 2019).
Although AIPAC’s membership today is likely split between Republicans and
Democrats, Peter Beinart argues that these numbers will likely dwindle in the future as a
result of demographic differences between younger and older American Jews. He
describes that, for older American Jews, “their broader liberalism inclines them to vote
Democratic. But their anxiety about Jewish safety and commitment to the Zionist project
incline them to join AIPAC” (Beinart 2018). However, young (non-orthodox) American
Jews are “less likely to bifurcate their views in this way” (Beinart 2018).
AIPAC has responded to these challenges by engaging in a struggle to maintain
bipartisanship. According to Beinart, the organization is “doubling down on
bipartisanship and ideological diversity even as tectonic shifts in American politics and
culture make that harder and harder” (Beinart 2018). One example of this was AIPAC’s
appeal to left and progressive factions of the pro-Israel movement in attendance at 2018
Policy Conference. The President of AIPAC Mort Fridman pled to the many thousands of
attendees, “the progressive narrative for Israel is just as compelling and critical as the
conservative one…There are very real forces trying to pull you out of this hall and out of
this movement and we cannot let that happen — we will not let that happen!” (Kampeas
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2018). The organization has also responded to these challenges through hosting
Democratic speakers—some to the left of Netanyahu. For example, AIPAC featured
former Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm, who called Israel a “progressive
paradise” (Beinart 2018). The CEO of AIPAC, Howard Kohr, also endorsed a two-state
solution, putting AIPAC “theoretically” to the left of Israel’s right-wing government
(Beinart 2018).
Another important challenge that AIPAC has faced since the 2016 election are the
significant internal changes within the Democratic Party. These changes have made it
more difficult for AIPAC to appeal to their left-leaning membership as well as target
Democratic politicians. One of the most significant and recent examples of progressive
politicians questioning AIPAC’s power is Minnesota Democratic Rep. Ilhan Omar vocal
criticism of Israel and AIPAC. In February, Omar responded to a “tweet from journalist
Glenn Greenwald, who posted about House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy threatening to
punish Omar and another congresswoman for being critical of Israel” (Nelson 2019).
Omar posted, "It's all about the Benjamins baby," suggesting that the reason the U.S.
solidly supports Israel is because of money (Nelson 2019). This tweet sparked extensive
criticism arguing that the tweet was anti-Semitic, for it called upon a “negative and
harmful stereotype of Jewish Americans” regarding Jewish people, money, and political
influence (Nelson 2019). Omar apologized and said that she was learning about "the
painful history of anti-Semitic tropes," yet still “reaffirm[ed] the problematic role of
lobbyists in our politics, whether it be AIPAC, the NRA or fossil fuel industry” (Omar,
Twitter, 2019). This incident illustrated the vast disagreements between progressive
democrats and Democratic party leaders, like Speaker Nancy Pelosi, on Israel (and other
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topics). In response to Omar's remarks, the House passed a resolution condemning hatred,
including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; Jewish Democrats had initially pushed for
version of the resolution that focused only on condemning anti-Semitism (Marcos 2019).
In reference to Omar’s tweet, Pelosi spoke at AIPAC Policy Conference the month
following, saying that “the full House came together to condemn the anti-Semitic myth of
dual loyalty and all forms of bigotry” (Marcos 2019).
Overall, changes in American politics since 2016 have confronted AIPAC’s
commitment and mission of bipartisanship, their members’ willingness to continue
coming together and reach across the aisle and support pro-Israel causes, and the
organization’s power within Washington. As a result, challenges to bipartisanship and the
growing divergence of views within the Democratic party make it more difficult for
AIPAC to control a narrative of widespread support for Israel. The growth and
mobilization of the two other case study organizations are an important part of this
picture and will be discussed in the following subsections.
The Jewish Left
Fundamental changes in American Politics have led to growth, challenges, and
polarization on the Jewish left. The mobilization of far-left progressive groups have led to
a divergence between left and far-left groups. Although these groups do agree on some
principles and share liberal values that promote the importance of social justice and
human rights, these groups disagree as to how to approach a Jewish connection to Israel.
Whereas center-left groups promote the unique Jewish connection to the land of Israel,
groups further to the left either reject Zionism altogether or remain silent on this issue.
The differences of views between these two groups, and how the rise of Trump catalyzed
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the growth of far-left-progressive groups, creates challenges for Jewish groups on the
center-left. I will explore the divergence of views and complicated relationship between
Jewish groups on the center- and far-left through examining the relationship between J
Street and IfNotNow.
The differences in age and ideology between the progressive- and center-left
within American Jewish Israel-politics mirrors the broader schisms within American
politics more generally. Within the democratic party, younger people are challenging the
older, more established leaders and groups to better integrate progressive norms into the
broader party platform. The same is occurring within American Jewish life, particularly
with Israel-politics. As Michelle Boorstein describes in her Washington Post article,
“#SkipAIPAC comes from new generation of Jewish activists,” these new groups are
“the product of post-millennial liberal politics, with antipathy toward nationalism of all
kinds and a hunger to tear down the entire system of money in politics” (Boorstein 2020).
While J Street’s founder Jeremy Ben Ami did say that he finds IfNotNow “really
exciting,” he also finds the newer groups distancing from pro-Israel norms as
“extraordinarily sad” (Boorstein 2020) (Reisman 2019, paragraph 11). Whereas J Street
sees itself as providing a liberal alternative to AIPAC, Ben Ami describes how younger
progressive groups separate themselves from J Street through expressing “‘you don’t
have to be pro-Israel, you should be pro-human rights, and everyone should have a state’”
(Boorstein 2020).
Since the 2016 election led to the empowerment and mobilization of far-left
groups, represented by the growth of INN, this political event also furthered the
divergence of views within the democratic party, and within American Jewish politics on
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Israel. While the organization was founded prior to the 2016 election, IfNotNow’s
membership and mobilization grew in conjunction to broader and cumulatively
progressive Democratic movements responding to the rise of Trump, championing an
intersectional fight for social justice. Changes within the Democratic party leading to a
schism between progressive and moderate factions has altered the Democratic party’s
platform and candidates’ positions on Israel to more closely align with progressive views
of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The mobilization of INN (and other like-minded
organizations) are correlated with transformational changes within the Democratic Party
and growing devotion to progressive causes and leadership. For example, IfNotNow’s
2020 platform calls upon American public officials to join young Jewish Americans in
“fighting for a better future — not just for American Jews but for all people” (IfNotNow
2020 Platform 2020). INN’s two-pronged platform, “Defunding Occupation” and “Fight
Anti-Semitism and White Supremacy,” constructs the connection between all suffering
and intolerance in the world today and promotes the importance of fighting for justice for
all peoples and not only the Jewish people (IfNotNow 2020 Platform 2020).
INN also understands itself as part of a progressive coalition that seeks to bridge
the ideological and generational divides within the Democratic party. For example, INN
aligned itself with other progressive Democratic organizations to share a #YouthVote
Letter with the presumptive Democratic nominee for the 2020 presidential election, Vice
President Joe Biden. The groups asked Biden to champion a set of progressive policies
regarding climate change, gun violence prevention, immigration, and healthcare (among
others) in order to “earn the support of our generation and unite the party for a general
election against Donald Trump” (#YouthVote Letter to Joe Biden, 2020).
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Meanwhile, younger generations of supporters have also sought to push forward
more progressive changes within mainstream institutions, like J Street, to maintain
relevance, galvanize support, and meet the challenges of the current moment. One
example of this was when thirty-five of J Street U’s (the university affiliate of J Street)
past and present board members sent a letter to J Street’s founder and president Ben-Ami
and the J Street Board asking for the organization to take “bold action … that responds
appropriately to this political moment” by “imposing actual, tangible costs” for Israel’s
occupation policies Current and former members of J Street U National Board 2018)
(Saleh and Grim 2019). As justification for taking these actions, the J Street U board
members cited changes in the base of the Democratic party as their reasoning:
In the past we may have feared that such a move would have compromised a
base of support among key backers. However, recently documented shifts in the
base of the Democratic Party and the successful campaigns of Rashida Tlaib
and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, candidates to J Street’s left who are widely
supported by young people in particular, demonstrate that there could be
widespread support amongst the democratic base for a strategic yet sharperedged posture towards the Israeli-occupation—and that J Street must activate
this base, at least partially in order to be in tune with the politics of our
generation (Current and former members of J Street U National Board 2018).
This letter illustrates that young people actively involved in J Street both recognize the
importance of what is happening to the left of their group through the energy of young
progressive Jews, and how the growth of this movement represents inherent challenges to
J Street. They see that in order for their organization to stay relevant and to continue
making a difference they will have to evolve their policies and efforts to the challenges of
the current times. The 2018 J Street U letter also clearly demonstrates how the 2016
election, and the fundamental changes in American politics stemming from it, directly
impacts their interest group’s power, political base, and views of their supporters.
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Conclusion
As discussed in chapter 2, there were already existing divisions across American
Jewish life prior to 2016, including vastly different generational experiences and political
divides. The 2016 election however played an important role in furthering trends of
political mobilization on the far left, as well as contributed to political polarization. The
transformations within American political culture resulting from the 2016 election
furthered the already existing divisions among American Jews.
This chapter depicts the interaction between American politics and American
Jewish political life. The many different groups of American Jews have had opposing
reactions to the election of Donald Trump and his alignment with establishment proIsrael interest groups’ policies. Some American Jewish interest groups have thanked
Trump for his pro-Israel policies. For others, establishment organizations’ support for
Trump’s pro-Israel policies have further alienated them from these institutions. Many
liberal Jews have organized into progressive groups that question not only Trump’s
illiberal policies towards other minority groups but also their own community’s role in
perpetuating injustice towards the Palestinian people.
The growing divide between American Jews over Israel is similarly entangled
with the evolving opinions of American Democratic politics on Israel. At the same time
as young American Jewish have flocked to liberal organizations that are more critical of
Israel, Democratic politicians have taken a new approach to Israel. For example, several
of the progressive, female candidates who won during the 2018 midterm election have
explicitly challenged mainstream groups and politicians with outspoken pro-Israel views.
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The direct impact of American politics on American Jewish politics related to
Israel can be seen through each of the three case study organizations representing
different populations and beliefs of American Jews. The alignment of Trump with Israeli
PM Netanyahu, and AIPAC’s support for Trump have made AIPAC’s efforts of retaining
its democratic base more difficult. Bipartisanship has grown increasingly rare across
American politics, yet establishment leaders have continued to promote the idea that
being pro-Israel is essentially bipartisan. With so many Democratic members who
support their organization, AIPAC feels that they must push back on those who challenge
bipartisanship through bringing in more liberal speakers and appealing to the progressive
wing of the organization to stay involved. On the center-left, J Street has received more
support from Democratic leadership who have grown more publicly critical of Israel
since 2016, while still wanting to support the state’s right to exist. However, young Jews
involved with J Street have simultaneously watched the energy grow further to their left,
leading them to question whether the future of their organization requires them to become
more progressive. On the far-left, American Jewish interest groups have experienced
massive growth in their protests and involvement since 2016. They have aligned with
other Jewish and non-Jewish interest groups to push back against the Jewish
establishment’s support for Israel. The distinctions between the Jewish center-left and
progressive interest groups has also grown clearer, especially as groups like IfNotNow
cross certain red lines.
The impact of American politics on these three case study organizations illustrates
that the 2016 election played an important role in shaping of American Jews’ political
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opinions and interest groups, leading to challenges to bipartisanship and spurring into
action progressive groups seeking to end the Israeli occupation.
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5
Conclusion
My thesis sought to answer the research question, how have fundamental changes
in American political culture since the 2016 election shaped American Jews political
stances and affected the representation of viewpoints within American Jewish interest
groups? My research brings light to the growing polarization and mobilization across
American Jewish life today. These changes were a result of already existing internal
American Jewish divides and trends, including generational differences and the diverging
beliefs of American and Israeli Jews, that were then furthered catalyzed by changes in
American political culture resulting from the 2016 election.
When I first began my research to answer this question, I realized that there was a
real deficiency of polling data that studied the relationship between recent changes in
American politics and those experienced within American Jewish political life.
Therefore, I sought other forms of evidence for this link, relying upon an organizational
analysis. By analyzing three organizations that represent different aspects of American
Jewish life, political opinions, and cultures, I depicted the many interrelated trends
occurring across different groups of American Jews today. When examined together,
these trends illustrate a constantly evolving American Jewish community, malleable to
the secular political and cultural trends occurring within the United States.
For those interested in this research question, further analysis and polling data are
necessary to better understand the connection between changes in American politics and
that within American Jewish life (as well as other religious or affinity groups). Although
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I chose to explore how recent changes in American politics impacted American Jewish
politics through looking specifically at Jewish Israel-related organizations, these changes
affected other realms, including mobilizing progressive Jewish organization focused
solely on promoting social justice, and not on Israel.

Divisions
The rise of Trump in 2016—and the subsequent transformations within American
political culture—furthered and illuminated the already existing divisions within
American Jewish politics. Trump’s unprecedented support for the Israeli right-wing
government, as well as his polarizing presidency, have created new challenges and
opportunities for American Jews across the political spectrum. Many young and liberal
Jews have joined the subsequent progressive political protests in response to Trump’s
election and his anti-Minority policies. Other mainstream Democratic Jews who are
emotionally attached to Israel have had to grapple with how to support a cause that is
now aligned with Trump. The recent growth of a progressive anti-Israel wing within the
Democratic party has also challenged pro-Israel Democrats, pushing them to wrestle
between their value of social justice and attachment towards Israel. At the same time, the
leaders and members of establishment Jewish institutions who lean more to the right on
the issue of Israel have been forced to respond to the ever-changing demographic of
American Jews, especially young Jews.
Young American Jews’ increasing participation in liberal movements as a result
of the 2016 election aligns with broader trends among young people across America. The
rise of Trump added fuel to progressive social movements that mobilized to counteract
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Trump’s conservative and anti-minority policies. These American Jews have been active
participants in these broad-based protests for the rights of underrepresented minorities in
America. For instance, thousands of people from across the country showed up at
“protests to speak out against the detention and mistreatment of undocumented
immigrants” (Kuruvilla 2019). American Jewish support for liberal causes efforts has
grown increasingly organized. Never Again Action, a Jewish organization founded in
June 2019 “fighting to end the US’ cruel immigration policies” now has 50 local chapters
throughout the United States (Never Again Action). Since 2016, progressive American
Jews have not only come together to support their neighbors and allies but also have
supported causes that strike closer to home. They have formed and mobilized into
organizations, seeking to end American Jewish organizations’ monetary and political
support for the Israeli occupation of Palestinians.
The resulting divisions within the American Jewish community over Israel
politics also mirrors the broader societal discord between progressive and conservative
Americans. American Jewish discord is just one instance of many wherein the rise of
Trump furthered existing disagreements and disunity within affinity groups. The
transformation of American Jewish political opinions and interest groups relays that the
2016 election impacted American life in many ways, pervading religious life and making
cohesion among communities and their beliefs much more difficult.

Narrowing In
American Jews’ participation and leadership in progressive American political
protests to support the political rights of minorities show how Jews have integrated
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themselves into broader American political culture. Their willingness to create and join
progressive movements that lift up other minorities demonstrates their commitment to
universalism. As a minority that has faced severe persecution, American Jews are
concerned not only with the well-being of their community today but also with ensuring
the rights of others. Newer and progressive organizations approach historical Jewish
suffering history as all the more reason to support other oppressed people in the world
and transform oppressive institutions. For example, Never Again Action asks Jews to join
the fight for undocumented immigrants in ICE detention centers because “Anne Frank
didn’t die in a gas chamber. Anne Frank died because she caught an infectious disease in
a concentration camp. We have seen this before. We won’t let it happen again. Never
again is now” (Never Again Action).
Like their progressive allies across America, progressive Jews have grown
increasingly wary of powerful institutions that dictate what to believe and support.
Instead, young Jews have flocked to join organizations that instead allocate power into
the hands of the people, as opposed to the leadership. For instance, the mobilization and
growth of IfNotNow illustrates that young Jews, like the rest of their secular peers, seek
truth and uphold universal values that prioritize an intersectional understanding of justice.
On the other hand, among establishment American Jewish institutions there is a
resistance to change. Historical Jewish suffering motivates Jews to support the security of
modern-day Israel at all costs. Within organizations like AIPAC, public criticism of Israel
is off-limits—at the risk of legitimizing the arguments of one’s enemies. However,
placing limits on an internal conversation regarding Israel’s flaws, particularly its
mistreatment of the Palestinian people and more than fifty years of Occupation, has had
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real costs. Although for some American Jews Israel and Zionism are so bound up in their
identity that they are willing to incur these costs to support Israel, others are not willing
to sacrifice this for their values that emphasize ensuring the rights and justice of all
peoples. Establishment organizations’ resistance to evolving with the current times has,
as a result, led to real sacrifices in terms of gaining widespread support from young Jews.
These organizations’ positions likely have and will continue to alienate young American
Jews, furthering the trend of “distancing.” As such, if these institutions continue on the
current path, it will contribute to a birth-cycle effect in which the percentage of Jews in
younger generations feel less and less of an emotional attachment to Israel.
Of course, there are some American Jews who have sought a middle ground,
supporting liberal Zionist organizations like J Street that straddle promoting a Jewish
connection to Israel as well as human rights and social justice. However, trends of
political polarization—both across America and within Jewish communities—have
brought right-leaning and leftist American Jews further from one another ideologically.
This trend has made a compromise of values increasingly difficult and has strengthened
forces from both sides to pull centrist groups in two different directions. For instance,
university-level leadership in J Street has found the newfound energy among youth in
progressive organizations compelling, recognizing that to take advantage of this energy
and power, their organization must compromise and evolve with the times.
The nature of the modern world has created further challenges and opportunities
for change. Technology has improved access to information and made possible the
mobilization of young Americans from across the country. IfNotNow’s #younevertoldme
campaign, in which alumni of Jewish organizations describe their experiences in
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American Jewish institutions that blocked access to information and shared a one-sided
perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would not have been possible to the same
extent fifteen-years ago. Without access to information through the internet regarding the
conflict, and to social media that allows opportunities to connect with others with similar
experiences, many of the changes today would not have been possible.

Zooming out
The changes in American Jewish life explored throughout my thesis depict the
way that American politics impact the internal politics of affinity and religious groups.
Although such groups like American Jews often have their own prevailing internal
cultures and conflicts, they are simultaneously influenced by the broader societal cultural
movements of its time. In American Jewish life and elsewhere, the influence of outside
culture and politics on the groups internally can spark new challenges; groups might
become torn between preserving tradition and the existing status quo as opposed to
reforming practices and beliefs to the modern day. This tension between maintaining
tradition and transforming to fit into the contemporary values can be seen within the
conflict between American Jewish Israel-related groups. The vast spectrum of beliefs—
from unwavering support for Israel on the right to upholding solidarity with the
Palestinians on the far-left—illustrates the diverging political responses of American
Jews as a result of confronting the modern world. Whereas the right has clung to
traditional values, the far-left has embraced present day values of social justice and
human rights. These different approaches demonstrate the challenges that the modern
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world creates in terms of interactions with particular groups with their own internal
cultures, values, and politics.
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